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1. Abstract
This work presents the ﬁrst compact, reliable and fully automated quantum key distribution
(QKD) system based on entanglement[1]. The system is integrated into standard 19-inch cases
and works at 1550nm for optimal use with optical ﬁbres. Several newly developed automation
and stabilisation modules like active adjustment of the entanglement source, polarisation control
and detector synchronisation guarantee a reliable distribution of entangled photons.
The QKD system has been integrated into the European SECOQC (Development of a Global
Network for Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) [2] quantum cryptogra-
phy network which has been presented in October 2008 in the ﬁbre network of Siemens Austria
[3, 4]. During a two-week demonstration with an optical ﬁbre of 16km length deployed between
two locations of Siemens in Vienna, we could achieve an average entanglement visibility of 93%
and a conﬁdence level of 99.9% to have a visibility higher than 90%.
The high maturity level our QKD system allows us to deploy a practical quantum cryptography
system almost on a plug&play basis. During the test phase over two weeks, a stable secure key
rate above 2kbit/s with an average QBER of 3.5% was achieved without manual intervention.
In the laboratory, a key exchange up to 50km with a key rate of more than 500bps is possible
using commercial InGaAs detectors.
The results show that it is possible to distribute entangled photons reliably in an inner-city
metropolitan area network (MAN) with standard telecom ﬁbres under real world conditions
despite several environmental ﬂuctuations.
7
1. Abstract
8
2. Introduction
In 2008, quantum cryptography made a large progress: the ﬁrst quantum cryptography network
with a ﬂexible structure has been demonstrated. The quantum key distribution (QKD) system
based on entanglement presented in this thesis was part of the European project SECOQC [2].
The quantum cryptography network has been presented in October 2008 in the ﬁbre network of
Siemens Vienna comprising six nodes and eight links.
Like every QKD system in the network, we had to fulﬁl several criteria:
 19-inch compatibility: the complete QKD system has to be delivered in 19-inch cases to ﬁt
into standard 19-inch racks.
 Telecom wavelength: the photons travelling from Alice to Bob should have the standard
telecom-wavelength (1550nm) to be compatible with standard single-mode ﬁbres.
 Secure key rate at 25km: at least one kbit/second.
 Easy network integration: the devices should be able to be integrated to the network
without manual adjustment of the optics inside.
 Reliable hands-oﬀ operation: the QKD system should reliably distribute keys between the
nodes without any manual intervention for at least 24 hours.
This thesis presents an entanglement based QKD system that meets all above criteria. It is
designed to work at 1550nm for the use in optical ﬁbres and uses the entanglement based
BBM92[5] key distribution protocol. The intrinsic correlations of an pair of entangled photons
are used to extract a secure key that can be used for data encryption.
Up to now, entanglement has been an issue for quantum optics laboratories, quantum information
theories and clearly not for reliable network devices that work on a hands-oﬀ basis. We are
however conﬁdent that all modules presented within this thesis can be applied also to other
entanglement-based quantum communication techniques for long term operation. We think, that
even if entanglement-based QKD turns out to be not commercially viable (our system is indeed
very close to a market-ready prototype), the automation and stabilisation techniques developed
for this system will have impetus on the quantum communication community as a whole.
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At the beginning of 2008, prototypes for polarisation and source stabilisation [6, 7, 8] existed with
several remaining problems. Since crucial components like hands-oﬀ state alignment, detector
(re-)synchronisation, system management and network integration were still not developed, the
QKD system was far away from being ready for a hands-oﬀ long term operation.
Hence, the ﬁrst part of this thesis was to develop automation and stabilisation modules that
would bring the system to a mature hands-oﬀ level. A reliable distribution of entangled photons
in a real-world environment (laid-out ﬁbres, temperature ﬂuctuations, etc.) was required. The
second part was the integration of the system to the SECOQC network. A preview of the resulting
QKD system is shown in ﬁg. 2.1.
Network infrastructure
Clients Clients
QKD System and 25km fibre
Figure 2.1.: The complete quantum cryptography system incorporating our entanglement based QKD
system. The two 19-inch racks contain the QKD devices Alice and Bob that are connected
using a 25km ﬁbre spool. During a public demonstration, a live video conference between
two clients has been encrypted using the link.
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 3 and 4 will give a short introduction to quantum
information and quantum cryptography. Chapter 5 gives an overview of our QKD system. Chap-
ter 6 presents the automation and stabilisation modules we have implemented to achieve the
objectives. Chapter 7 presents several experimental results including the ﬁrst long-term tests
prior to the network integration. Chapter 8 will give a short overview of the SECOQC network
in Vienna and explains the integration of our QKD system to the network structure. Finaly,
the results during a two-week test phase are presented. To conclude, a short outlook on further
developments of the QKD system and side-channel attacks is given in chapter 9. In appendix A,
a new solution for real-time monitoring of the complete system and reliable database logging is
presented.
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In the last decades, quantum communication and quantum information has matured from a
purely fundamental research area to an applied science. Fundamental properties of quantum
mechanics like superposition and entanglement give the qubit (the basic unit in quantum infor-
mation) a completely new property and lead to several new applications like quantum cryptog-
raphy, quantum teleportation and quantum computing.
At the moment, the most mature application of quantum communication is quantum cryptog-
raphy [9, 10]. In the last ten years, quantum cryptography progressed from the ﬁrst proof-of-
concept experiments [11, 12] to prototypes for reliable and stable network devices like the system
presented in this thesis.
This chapter will give a short overview of the basic elements in quantum information that are
necessary to understand the principles of quantum cryptography.
3.1. The Qubit
The basic element of quantum information is the qubit. A qubit is a quantum-mechanical two-
level system with two orthogonal states denoted as |0〉 and |1〉, analogous to the classical bit
that can have the values 0 or 1. The two states |0〉 and |1〉 form an orthogonal basis in the
two-dimensional Hilbert space. The striking diﬀerence to the classical bit is that the qubit can
be in any superposition of the two basis states:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 with |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (3.1)
3.1.1. Polarisation encoded Qubits
In the QKD system presented in this work, qubits will be realised by the polarisation state of
single photons. This has several advantages: photons can be transported in optical ﬁbres, easily
manipulated with optical elements and measured on a single photon level.
The qubit basis states are mapped to |H〉, a single photon with horizontal polarisation and |V 〉,
a single photon with vertical polarisation.
|0〉 −→ |H〉 (3.2)
|1〉 −→ |V 〉 (3.3)
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Throughout this work, some other distinct polarisation states and their qubit-representation will
be used:
|P 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) +45◦ linear (3.4)
|M〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) -45◦ linear (3.5)
|L〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ i|V 〉) left-handed circular (3.6)
|R〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − i|V 〉) right-handed circular (3.7)
3.1.2. Measuring a Qubit
Quantum mechanics only allows calculating the probability of measuring a qubit in a certain
state. If one measures for instance the polarisation state |P 〉 in the (|H〉, |V 〉) basis, the probabil-
ity is |α|2 = 0.5 to obtain horizontal polarisation and |β|2 = 0.5 to obtain vertical polarisation.
On the other hand, when the same state is measured in the P/M basis, the result will always be
+45◦ polarisation. The state after the measurement is determined by the measurement value.
From this, another principle that is important for the security of quantum cryptography follows:
in general, it is impossible to measure non-orthogonal states precisely and without perturbing
these states. In other words, the state of a qubit can be determined with certainty only when
the preparation basis is known.
3.1.3. No-cloning Theorem
A very essential property for the security of quantum cryptography is that a single qubit cannot
be copied perfectly. This is known as the no-cloning theorem which was ﬁrst shown by Wooters
and Zurek [13]. A general cloning machine should copy the original qubit onto a blank qubit,
i.e. should perform following operations:
|0〉|0〉 −→ |0〉|0〉 (3.8)
|1〉|0〉 −→ |1〉|1〉 (3.9)
Where |0〉|0〉 denotes a two-qubit state. The ﬁrst is the state to be cloned, the second is a blank
target state that should hold the same state as the input afterwards.
If one chooses a superposition state, e.g. 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉), then the machine will produce the following
output due to the linearity of quantum mechanics:
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|0〉 −→ 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉) (3.10)
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On the other hand, the output of the copying machine should be
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)|0〉 −→ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
=
1
2
(
|0〉|0〉 + |0〉|1〉 + |1〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉
)
(3.11)
which is clearly not the state 3.10. Generally, a universal cloning machine that copies an arbitrary
initial state does not exist.
3.2. Entanglement
A pure two-qubit state that cannot be written as a product state |ψ〉AB = |ψA〉|ψB〉 is called
entangled. The deﬁnition sounds simple but implies a completely new quality. For example,
consider the antisymmetric entangled state
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(
|VA〉|HB〉 − |HA〉|VB〉
)
(3.12)
The two individual qubits are in an undeﬁned state while the overall state deﬁnes their joint
properties. The state predicts strong correlations between the measurement results of the two
qubits: although the measurement outcome is random, both qubits will always be found in
an orthogonal state. Independent of the distance between the two qubits and of which part is
measured ﬁrst.
In quantum communication, the two systems sharing the entangled state are usually called
Alice and Bob. When Alice measures the polarisation of her qubit, she will yield vertical or
horizontal polarisation with a probability of 50%. Instantaneous, the post-measurement state
becomes |H〉|V 〉 or |V 〉|H〉. Hence, Bob will measure vertical polarisation when Alice measured
horizontal and vice versa.
State 3.17 is one of the four so-called Bell states that form a basis in the two-qubit space (four-
dimensional Hilbert space):
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉|V 〉 − |V 〉|H〉
)
(3.13)
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉|V 〉+ |V 〉|H〉
)
(3.14)
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉|H〉 − |V 〉|V 〉
)
(3.15)
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉|H〉 + |V 〉|V 〉
)
(3.16)
The speciality of the |ψ−〉 state is it’s rotational symmetry. The state has the same form inde-
pendent of the measurement basis:
13
3. Basics of Quantum Information
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(
|H〉|V 〉 − |V 〉|H〉
)
=
1√
2
(
|P 〉|M〉 − |M〉|P 〉
)
=
1√
2
(
|R〉|L〉 − |L〉|R〉
)
(3.17)
In contrast, the |ψ+〉 state for example transforms to |φ−〉 in the P/M basis. Therefore, the |ψ−〉
state is very applicable for the quantum cryptography protocols that will be presented in the
next chapter.
3.2.1. EPR-Paradox and Bell-Inequalities
It is remarkable that entanglement can be used to solve a practical problem like data encryption
but has it origins from fundamental questions concerning the completeness of quantum mechanics
provoked by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR-paradox) [14] in 1935.
EPR argued that a measurement on one side may not have an instantaneous (non-local) inﬂuence
on the state of a arbitrary distant qubit. When Alice measures her part of the entangled state
ﬁrst, yielding randomly either vertical or horizontal polarisation when a |ψ−〉 state is shared,
Bob’s qubit is left in a well-deﬁned state. EPR argued that the quantum mechanical description
cannot be considered complete since the deﬁniteness of Bob’s state is not part of the quan-
tum mechanical formalism. In their opinion, the measurement result of both qubits should be
explainable by a local realistic theory (e.g. a list of hidden parameters the photons carry along).
Almost 30 years later, John Bell showed in 1964 that no such local realistic theory can explain
all predictions by quantum mechanics, in particular the correlations in an entangled state [15].
Bell derived an inequality for correlation measurements that should be obeyed by local realistic
theories. However, the inequality has since then been violated in many entanglement experiments,
e.g. [16].
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Cryptography is the study of hiding information. In the last 2500 years, encrypting messages to
keep information conﬁdential has been primary a military issue. Nowadays - in the era of the
information society - large parts of our daily routine are dominated by electronic communication:
e-mail, telephony, e-banking, online-shopping, credit card payments, etc. Clearly, data security
and cryptography has become an important issue for everyone. This chapter will give a short
overview on classical and quantum approaches to cryptography.
In the usual scenario, Alice1 wants to send a message to Bob in a way that no eavesdropper
(Eve) can intercept the message. For this purpose, Alice and Bob use a cryptographic system.
Most of the modern cryptosystems are based on publicly announced algorithms and standardized
protocols, the security only depends on the secrecy of the keys [18]2. Dependent on the usage of
the keys one can distinguish two kinds of cryptosystems:
 A symmetric system uses the same key for sender (encryption) and receiver (decryption)
 An asymmetric system uses diﬀerent keys for encryption and decryption
4.1. One-Time-Pad
Gilbert Vernam suggested to use a random bit-string as the key to encrypt a binary encoded
message[19]. Later, this method got to be known as One-Time-Pad (OTP) because the key -
written on a pad - should be used only once. Vernam’s cryptosystem works as follows:
1. Alice applies a bitwise XOR on the message and the key. The result is the cipher text that
is transmitted over the public channel
2. Bob applies a bitwise XOR on the cipher text and key to retrieve the message
This scheme is absolutely secure when four conditions are fulﬁlled:
1. The key is random (Eve has no information on the key and can only guess)
2. Alice and Bob have the same key (OTP is a symmetrical cryptosystem)
3. The key is exchanged secretly (only Alice and Bob know the key)
1Alice and Bob appeared for the ﬁrst time in [17]
2This is known as Kerckhoﬀ’s principle
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10011001
10110100
00101101
10110100
10011001
message cipher message
key
Alice Bob
key
Figure 4.1.: One-Time-Pad scheme.
4. The key is only used once (by using the key more then once, the XOR scheme can be
cracked immediately by looking for auto-correlations)
On the other hand, the OTP-scheme imposes several disadvantages:
 First, computer algorithms are not able to generate real random numbers, only so-called
pseudo random numbers.
 More important is the practical disadvantage of OTP that the key needs to have the same
length as the message. It is therefore not applicable for typical internet communication
and even less for practical data networks (LAN, WAN).
To overcome this drawback, modern symmetrical cryptosystems like the current standard AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) use the same key to encrypt more than one message (block
ciphers). The key is usually distributed prior to data transmission and should be refreshed
frequently3. At the moment, it is assumed [18] that a renewal rate of one minute is more than
suﬃcient even for the fastest available AES encryption. AES is considered secure and practically
useful but has the same problem as OTP: how can one distribute a key between Alice and Bob
securely? This is known as the key distribution problem.
4.1.1. Key distribution: classical approach
In 1975, Whitﬁeld Diﬃe and Martin Hellman [20] suggested to use a mathematical one-way
function for an asymmetric cryptosystem. The Diﬃe-Hellman key-exchange is based on modulo-
operations and allows Alice and Bob to establish a key without exchanging the actual key.
Two years later, in 1977, Rivest, Shamir and Adlemen (RSA) found a similar algorithm to encrypt
and decrypt messages without prior distribution of a secret key. The RSA cryptosystem, which
is employed by all common internet-protocols (SSL, TLS) uses two diﬀerent keys:
 The public key is used for encryption and is announced publicly
 The private key is used to decrypt the message and has to be kept secret
3Internet protocols like SSL/TLS exchange the session key only once, e.g. when the users enters the https-website
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The security of the system lies in the diﬃculty of factoring large numbers and hence is based on
assumptions of computational power of practical computers. In 2003 Shamir (the S in RSA) and
Tromer suggested a hardware design [21] that is able to crack an RSA 1024 key (to extract the
private key out of the public key) within one year at a total cost of 10-50 million dollars. 1024 is
the typical key length used nowadays for most applications. In 2007, a group at the University
of Bonn succeeded to factorise a 1039-bit number [22]. Because of the possibility to parallelise
the factoring algorithms, computational power is not a matter of technologies but a ﬁnancial
issue. Furthermore, there is no proof that no eﬃcient algorithm exists which could then crack
RSA more eﬃciently. Although not feasible at the moment, a quantum computer poses another
threat to classical cryptography. Peter Shor showed that a quantum algorithm exists that can
solve the factoring problem eﬃciently [23].
4.2. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Although the idea to use quantum mechanics for encryption was ﬁrst proposed by Stephen
Wiesner in the 1970s [24], the ﬁrst practical protocol was developed by Charles Bennett and
Gilles Brassard in 1984 [25]. In their scheme, the laws of quantum information are used to
distribute a key secretly. As pointed out earlier, it is the security of the key that makes a
cryptosystem secure.
Alice      Bob
Quantum channel
Classical channel
1
0
H V P M
Figure 4.2.: Scheme for the BB84 protocol: Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel (unidi-
rectional) and a public classical channel
In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob are connected by two channels: a quantum channel and a
classical channel which does not need to be secure, but authenticated.
1. Alice chooses randomly one of four non-orthogonal polarisation states |V 〉, |H〉, |P 〉, |M〉
and sends a single photon prepared in that state to Bob using the quantum channel.
2. Bob measures the photon’s polarisation by randomly choosing the H/V or P/M basis
Afterwards, the polarisation state prepared by Alice and measured by Bob is assigned to a
classical bit:
|H〉 −→ 0
|V 〉 −→ 1
|P 〉 −→ 0
|M〉 −→ 1 (4.1)
Alice and Bob continue this scheme to obtain a correlated bit-stream with a given length, the
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Basis Reconciliation
Privacy Amplification
Authentication
Error Correction
Raw Key
Final Secure Key
Prepare & Send
Final Key
Secure Key
Corrected Key
Sifted Key
Raw Key
H,P,V,M,H,M,H,V,M,…
Final Key
Secure Key
Corrected Key
Sifted Key
Loss
Alice Bob
Raw Key
Received Photons
Figure 4.3.: QKD protocol stack: Alice ﬁrst prepares and sends a sequence of polarisation encoded qubits.
The raw bit string (raw key) that Alice and Bob share after the measurements is then reduced
in several steps to obtain a secure and error-free key.
so-called raw key (an example is given in table 4.1). To extract a secure key from the raw key,
some more steps are necessary (ﬁgure 4.3).
Alice Bob
Number Sending Key-Bit Basis Result Key-Bit
1 H 0 H/V H 0
2 V 1 P/M ? ?
3 P 0 H/V ? ?
4 M 1 P/M M 1
5 V 1 H/V V 1
6 P 0 P/M P 0
7 M 1 H/V ? ?
8 H 1 P/M ? ?
Table 4.1.: Example for the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. Alice sends a
random sequence of qubits, here polarisation encoded photons. Bob randomly chooses
the measurement basis. A ’?’ represents the case when Alice and Bob used diﬀerent
basis and Bob will obtain a random result. These bits will be discarded later by the
basis reconciliation procedure.
The security of this scheme lies in the use of two non-orthogonal bases. A potential eavesdropper
(Eve) does not know the basis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a measurement principally
changes a quantum state that is not orthogonal to the measurement basis. Therefore every
interaction with the single photon will unavoidably introduce some errors. Eve could simply try
to measure the photon and resend the obtained state. Since Eve does not know the basis, she
must guess and hence introduce errors with a probability of 25%. By comparing a fraction of the
key, Alice and Bob can immediately detect Eve’s activities by looking on the number of errors
in the key. A compromised key will be discarded immediately.
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4.2.1. Basis reconciliation
Alice and Bob will only share the same state when Bob measures in the basis of the transmitted
photon. As Eve, also Bob does not know the basis Alice used. For example, when Alice sends a
qubit in state |H〉 and Bob chooses the P/M basis, he will randomly obtain either P or M (each
with a probability of 50%). Therefore, Bob uses the classical channel to tell Alice which basis
he used after the measurement. Subsequently, Alice and Bob discard their entries in which they
used diﬀerent basis. The output is called the sifted key and has approximately half the length
of the raw key. Note that the classical communication used for the sifting process only contains
the measurement basis and not the measurement result (classical bit value).
4.2.2. Error Correction
In a real QKD system, some unavoidable errors will be introduced even when no eavesdropping
occurs. Analogous to the classical bit error ratio (BER), the qubit error ratio (QBER) is deﬁned
as the ratio of wrong bits to the total number of bits in the sifted key. The inherent wrong bits
can be corrected using classical protocols.
The minimum number of bits ropt that needs to be exchanged between Alice and Bob for error
correction is given by Shannon’s coding theorem [26]
ropt = nsifted · h(e) (4.2)
where nsifted is the length of the sifted key and e the QBER with Shannon’s binary entropy
function4
h(e) = −e log2(e) − (1− e) log2(1− e) (4.3)
However, it is not possible to reach this limit. Realistic error correction protocols need to ex-
change more bits to locate the errors. The algorithm used in our QKD system - CASCADE [27]-
is based on intense bidirectional communication of parity bits (on the public channel). As ﬁgure
4.4 shows, CASCADE works about 15% to 21% above the Shannon limit.
rreal = f(e) · ropt(e) with f(e) ≥ 1 (4.4)
Eve could use the information leakage during error correction to obtain some knowledge of the
key. Therefore, the key needs to be shortened by the number of bits exchanged (rreal) using an
error-dependent hash-function. The implementation of the error-correction process in our system
also allows to estimate the QBER in the overall key. Hence it is not necessary to compare a
fraction of the key over the classical channel.
4.2.3. Privacy Ampliﬁcation
Using various attack strategies, Eve can obtain information about the key. Generally, every
attempt by Eve to increase her knowledge of the key will also increase the QBER. The privacy
4h(e) is the conditional entropy for a binary symmetric channel with a bit-inversion probability e
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ampliﬁcation [28] technique allows reducing Eve’s knowledge to a minimum. For this purpose,
an error-dependent hash-function is used to map the input-string to a shorter output string
In [29] Norbert Luetkenhaus gives a bound for the maximum amount of information in bits Eve
can have for a certain QBER.
τ(e) =
{
log2(1 + 4e− 4e2) for e < 0.5
1 for e ≥ 0.5 (4.5)
τ(e) determines the length of the error-dependent fraction by which the key has to be shortened
during privacy ampliﬁcation. Note that equation 4.5 is valid only for individual attacks where
Eve accesses only one photon at a time. For more general attack schemes (where Eve can access
more than one photon coherently) the number of bits to be discarded is equal to Shannon’s
entropy h(e) [30, 31].
Combining error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation gives the length of the resulting secure key
(nsifted is the size of the sifted key):
nsecure = nsifted [1− τ(e)]− rreal(e)
= nsifted [1− τ(e)− f(e) · h(e)] (4.6)
In our system, the security-related key-reduction for privacy ampliﬁcation and error correction
is done in one step using a Toeplitz-Matrix with the size nsecure× nsifted. Figure 4.4 shows that
is possible to obtain a secret key up to a QBER of 11.4% for ideal error correction and 9.7%
when the CASCADE protocol is used.
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Figure 4.4.: Top: number of secure bits per sifted bit in the case of ideal error correction compared
to the CASCADE error correction protocol. Note that the blue line originates from our
experimental values.
Bottom: Overhead f(e) of the CASCADE error correction protocol compared to the ideal
error correction (Shannon limit). CASCADE works about 15% to 21% above the Shannon
limit. The ”cloudy” shape of the overhead function comes from the heuristic approach of
CASCADE. The actual number of exchanged bits depends on the distribution of wrong bits
in the key and thus can vary for keys with the same QBER.
Privacy ampliﬁcation allows to deal with (theoretical) attacks on the BB84 protocol, i.e. di-
rectly on the qubits. A completely diﬀerent and technically feasible approach is to attack the
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implementation of the protocol and not the protocol itself. Such attacks are called side-channel
attacks and pose a realistic threat to every QKD system. Section 9.4 will give an overview of
the implications of several side-channel-attacks on our QKD system.
4.2.4. Authentication
The privacy ampliﬁcation technique described above cannot rule out a so-called man-in-the-
middle attack where an intruder tries to control the communication between Alice and Bob.
Alice BobAliceModule 2
Eve
Quantum channel
Classical channel
Quantum channel
Classical channel
Bob
Module 2
Figure 4.5.: ”Woman-in-the-middle” attack: Eve cuts both channels and pretends to be Alice and Bob
This is not a completely unrealistic scenario because Eve could simply buy the devices from
the reseller (e.g. from idQuantique [32] when she knows that the QKD-link is provided by this
company) and cut both channels. Therefore, Alice and Bob have to ensure that their vis-a´ -vis
is really the one they want to communicate with.
For this purpose, a classical authentication method proposed by Wegman and Carter in 1981
[33] can be used (ﬁgure 4.6). Before the QKD system is installed, a pre-shared authentication-
key is set in the factory (or laboratory). When the ﬁrst key-block leaves the QKD protocol
stack, an authentication tag is calculated from the key-block using a hash-function that depends
on the authentication-key. For authentication, Alice and Bob subsequently compare the tag.
The tags calculated by Alice and Bob are equal if and only if both used the same pre-shared
authentication-key.
Key Block 1 Key Block 2
Hash Hash
Tag Tag
Key Block 3
Hash
Tag
pre -shared 
authentication -key
Figure 4.6.: Authentication scheme to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
To authenticate the next key-block, a fraction of the previous key block is kept as the next
authentication-key. The BB84 protocol is therefore sometimes denoted as a Quantum Key Grow-
ing protocol since a initial pre-shared key is required.
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4.2.5. Data encryption
QKD only deals with the secret distribution of keys between Alice and Bob. For data encryption,
classical algorithms like one-time-pad (OTP) or AES are used.
4.3. Entanglement based QKD
In 1991, Artur Ekert proposed a protocol that is based on entanglement [34]. A source creates
entangled qubits and distributes them to Alice and Bob. The correlations of a shared entangled
state can be used to yield a symmetric key. In the original scheme, Alice and Bob use a fraction
of the raw key to check a Bell-inequality. If it is violated, then no eavesdropper was active. If
Eve tries to intercept and resend the photons, she acts as a deterministic photon source and
therefore leads to a valid Bell inequality.
QKD 
Measurements
EncryptionMessage Message
Key Key
Public
Decryption
Channel
QKD 
Measurements
Alice Bob
Entanglement
Source
Entanglement 
Correlations
10
11
0.
..
10
11
0.
..
Figure 4.7.: Scheme for entanglement based quantum cryptography. A source distributes entangled pho-
tons between Alice and Bob where the entanglement correlations are used to establish a
secure key. For practical purposes, the entanglement source also can be integrated in one of
the QKD devices.
One year later, Bennett, Brassard and David Mermin [5] modiﬁed the original BB84 protocol
and added an entanglement source that distributes the photons to Alice and Bob. This is the
protocol we use for our QKD system. The diﬀerence to the BB84 protocol is that both Alice
and Bob randomly choose either the H/V or the P/M basis and measure the polarisation of an
shared entangled state. When Alice and Bob share the |ψ−) state, they will obtain random but
perfectly correlated measurement results when both used the same measurement basis (Bob has
to reverse his bit string since |ψ−) predicts anti-correlated results). This already meets two of
the requirements for an absolutely secure OTP cryptosystem (a random but equal key string
on both sides). Basis reconciliation and the other parts of the BB84 protocol do not need to be
modiﬁed.
Compared to the BB84 protocol (prepare-and-measure), BBM92 has a signiﬁcant advantage: no
external random number generator or any other active component which can be compromised
is necessary. As shown in the next chapter, the protocol can be implemented using passive
components only.
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This chapter gives an overview of the components of the whole QKD system (ﬁg. 5.1). The
complete setup consists of the following:
 two 19-inch cases: Alice and Bob
 a quantum channel (single-mode ﬁbre) connecting Alice and Bob
 two computers for the BBM92 post-measurement protocol (sifting, error-correction, au-
thentication)
 a classical channel connecting the computers
5.1. Alice
The core of the system is the polarisation-entangled photon source emitting pairs with asym-
metric wavelengths (810nm and 1550nm). Details of the source can be found in [35]. Here it
is suﬃcient to say that a 532nm cw-laser pumps two ppKTP crystals for type-I spontaneous
parametric downconversion (SPDC). The two crystals are poled for collinear emission of 810nm
and 1550nm photons. The polarisation state after the two crystals is given by:
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉810|H〉1550 + eiφ|V 〉810|V 〉1550) (5.1)
The 810nm and 1550nm photons are split using a dichroic mirror and coupled into single mode
optical ﬁbres. For an active stabilisation of the entanglement source (see sec. 6.1), the ﬁbre
couplers and a mirror after the laser are assembled on piezo mounts with two tilt axes.
The 810nm photons pass an in-ﬁbre polarisation controller before entering the BB84 module.
Here the photons are recollimated onto a balanced beamsplitter (BS) and then directed to two
polarising cube beamsplitters (PBS). The PBSs are rotated by 45◦relative to each other along
the transmission axis to perform measurements in the 0◦/90◦(H/V) and in the +45◦/-45◦(P/M)
basis.
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Figure 5.1.: Overview of the complete QKD system
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5.1. Alice
The four output ports of the PBSs are coupled into multimode ﬁbers connected to an array of
four Si-APDs (SPCM-AQ4C from Perkin Elmer). The TTL outputs from the detectors are fed
into an electronic board (Xilinx Virtex 4 FX20). All FPGA boards used in the system (Alice,
Bob, PolAlice, PolBob) are combinations of a Xilinx Virtex 4 platform providing the FPGA
logic and embedded CPU (IBM PPC405) together with custom-built electronics.
BS
50/50
PBS
at 45°
PBS
4x
Si-APD
V
H P
M
PBS 
BS 
id200
InGaAs-APD
id200
InGaAs-APD
id200
InGaAs-APD
id200
InGaAs-APD
V
H
M
P
PBS 
Polarization
Controller PC2
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2.: (a) free-space BB84 module for Alice. The 50/50 beam splitter randomly transmits or re-
ﬂects a single photon and hence carries out the random selection of the measurement basis.
The polarising beam splitter (PBS) transmits a horizontal photon and reﬂects a vertical
photon. The second PBS is rotated 45◦in respect to the other to perform the measurement
in the P/M basis.
(b) all-ﬁbre BB84 module for Bob. The polarisation controller allows to rotate the measure-
ment basis of the ﬁrst PBS to 45◦in respect to the second PBS.
Every time a 810nm photon is detected at Alice, a strong synchronisation pulse at 1610nm is
generated and merged with the single photons at 1550nm using a WDM (wavelength division
multiplexer). Before sending the sync-pulse, the detection event is delayed individually for ev-
ery channel to prevent side-channel attacks (see sec. 9.4.2). The pulse at 1610nm is used to
synchronise the detection events between Alice and Bob and to trigger Bob’s InGaAs-detectors.
After the WDM, the signals pass an optical switch necessary for the operation of the polarisation
stabilisation. The ﬁbre is connected at the front plate of Alice to the quantum channel (a
standard telecom single-mode ﬁbre, SMF), allowing the 1550nm photons to travel to Bob. The
second input to the optical switch comes from PolAlice, another Xilinx board that is used for
stabilisation purposes. PolAlice drives the piezo mounts for source stabilisation (see sec. 6.1) and
two laser diodes at 1550nm for polarisation control (see sec. 6.3).
The quantum channel is multiplexed in time and wavelength (ﬁg. 5.3). During the QKD op-
eration, the sync-pulse (1610nm) follows the single photon (1550nm). For polarisation control
purposes, the quantum channel is switched to PolAlice sending reference pulses with certain
polarisation (H and P) at 1550nm.
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Single-Photon 
(1550nm)
Sync-Pulse 
(1610nm)
PolCtrl-Reference 
(1550nm)
HP
Figure 5.3.: Timing-sequence of single photons, sync-pulses and polarisation control (PolCtrl) reference
pulses showing the time and wavelength multiplexing of the quantum channel.
5.2. Bob
On Bob’s side, almost all optical components are ﬁbre based. First, a WDM-demultiplexer splits
the sync-pulses at 1610nm from the 1550nm channel (single-photons and reference pulses for
polarisation control).
The 1610nm sync-pulse is converted to an electronic signal at a FPGA electronic board. After
an individual delay for precise detector synchronisation (see sec. 6.4), a trigger pulse (TTL) is
passed to the InGaAs detectors where the gate voltage is applied just at time when the photon
is expected.
The single photons at 1550nm ﬁrst pass a 32m delay ﬁbre to give the InGaAs detectors time
to apply their gates. Subsequently, the single photons pass an electronic polarisation controller
(General Photonics PolaRite II [36]) and an unbalanced 95:5 beam splitter to reach the ﬁbre-
based BB84 module. One arm of the BB84 module contains another polarisation controller to
rotate the measurement axis of the ﬁrst basis (H/V) to 45◦with respect to the other basis (P/M).
All four outputs of the two PBSs are coupled to InGaAs APDs (IdQuantique id200/id201).
A small fraction (5%) of the 1550nm light is coupled out before the BB84 module and is di-
rected to a classical six-channel polarimeter where the strong reference pulses from PolAlice
are analysed. The polarimeter and the PolaRite controller in the quantum channel are used for
polarisation control purposes (see sec. 6.3).
The sync-pulses at 1610nm also facilitate the synchronisation of detection events needed for the
sifting process. Before sifting, Bob tells Alice which trigger pulses resulted in a detection event.
Alice deletes all other entries. Both share subsequently a raw key of the same length that is
processed by the QKD protocol stack (see sec. 4.2) to yield a secure key.
The software implementing the QKD protocol stack is located on two computers that are con-
nected to Alice and Bob via Ethernet. Alternatively, the QKD stack can run directly on the
embedded CPU (PowerPC 405 for a single-chip solution (“Quantum Cryptography on a Chip”
[37]). However this approach is limited to key rates of about 1kbit/s due to computational
limitations of the embedded CPU.
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5.3. 19-inch packaging
The system was designed to be installed in a standard 19-inch rack. Therefore also all components
have to ﬁt into 19-inch cases.
Alice
Bob
Classical 
Channel
PolBob FPGA
Alice 
FPGA
PolAlice 
FPGA 4xSi-APDDetectors
Entanglement source
Quantum
 channel
Bob
FPGA
Electronic
Polarisation
Controllers
Connectors for
InGaAs Detectors
Quantum
 channel
Classical
Channel
a) b)
Figure 5.4.: Alice (6 height units, approx. 26cm) and Bob (3 HU, approx. 13cm) in their ﬁnal 19-inch
cases. Only the four InGaAs detectors at Bob need to be placed outside.
The entanglement source is assembled on a monolithic aluminium plate (42x26cm). It is located
on the bottom in Alice’s case, together with the BB84 module and the ﬁbre switch. On top are
the Si-detectors, the main power supply and the two FPGA boards (Alice, PolAlice). The front
plate contains two Ethernet connectors for Alice and PolAlice, a JTAG interface for programming
PolAlice and the ﬁbre output for the quantum channel.
Bob’s case contains the two polarisation controllers, the polarimeter (just behind the front side,
not visible in ﬁg. 5.4), the FPGA boards (Bob, PolBob) and the ﬁbre based BB84 module which
is encased in plastic. Only the four commercial InGaAs detectors do not ﬁt into the case and
need to be placed outside. They are connected using BNC cables for trigger and detection output
and a short ﬁbre for the single photons. The front plate contains two Ethernet connectors for
Alice and PolAlice, a JTAG interface for programming PolBob, the interfaces to the detectors
and the ﬁbre intput for the quantum channel.
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One of the main parts of this thesis deals with the automation and stabilisation of the complete
QKD system to meet the requirements mentioned in the introduction. Three issues need to be
considered: automation, stabilisation and coordination.
First, every task that is necessary to start the QKD system and is manually done in the labo-
ratory has to be automated. In particular:
 Adjustment of the ﬁbre couplers in the entanglement source to keep the entanglement rates
high
 Adjustment of Bob’s measurement axis to align the desired entangled state (|ψ−〉)
 Precise synchronisation of the InGaAs detector gates with the arrival of the single photons
The second issue is the stabilisation of the QKD system once it is started:
 Active stabilisation of the ﬁbre couplers in the entanglement source
 Stabilisation of the polarisation in the quantum channel
 Periodic detector re-synchronisation
The third issue is the coordination of the QKD system:
 Coordination of all modules for a hands-oﬀ start-up of the complete system.
 Coordination of the stabilisation modules during normal operation.
 Handling of errors that might occur during a long-term QKD run.
All these issues will be covered in the following sections. Note that none of these issues is QKD
speciﬁc. One can consider the BBM92 protocol as an application that uses the entanglement
correlations. As already mentioned in the introduction, we are conﬁdent these modules is can
be applied also to other entanglement-based protocols that are currently on an experimental
proof-of-principle level.
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6.1. Source Stabilisation (SourceStab)
The entanglement source is based on free space optics and hence prone to mechanical drifts due
to temperature ﬂuctuations. The most crucial parts are the couplers where the single photons
are coupled into single-mode ﬁbres. Even small deviations from the optimal coupler position
will reduce the coupling eﬃciency signiﬁcantly. The focus of the pump laser is also important,
deviations here (beam wander) will reduce the production rate of entangled photons
A reliable and fully automated stabilisation of the entanglement source is therefore absolutely
inevitable to achieve a complete hands-oﬀ operation of the whole system. During the SECOQC
demonstration, the source will be enclosed in a 19” case and is therefore not even accessible for
manual control.
For this purpose, both couplers and a mirror behind the laser are assembled on piezo mounts
AM-M100 from Newport with two tilt axes. All six piezo channels are driven by PolAlice. Unfor-
tunately, the manufacturer does not provide any suitable (microprocessor-compatible) interface
to the piezo actuators, only a remote (hand-held) control is provided. The FPGA therefore has to
short-circuit the buttons of the remote control to make them accessible for the software running
on the CPU. Additionally, the output of a single remote control is multiplexed using relays to
access all six channels.
It is intuitively clear that the order of driving the piezo-actuators must be the same as the order
of the optical elements in the source itself. The adjustment of the pump laser inﬂuences the
production rate of photon pairs and hence inﬂuences the count rate on Alice and the coincidence
rate on Bob. The coupling eﬃciency of the 810nm coupler inﬂuences the count rate on Alice
witch is equal to the trigger rate of Bob’s detectors. Therefore, the sequence of driving the
piezo-mounts is:
1. Pump laser mirror
2. 810nm coupler
3. 1550nm coupler
Step 1 and 2 are based on Alice’s count rate, Step 3 on Bob’s coincidence rate. Alice and Bob
therefore send their individual detector rates via Ethernet (UDP) in an one-second interval
to PolAlice. The software running on PolAlice analyses the input (table 6.1) and drives the
piezo-motors using a certain algorithm (Hill-Climber) to maximise the count rates.
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Channel Piezo-Component Data source
0 Laser mirror, axis 1 Alice
1 Laser mirror, axis 2 Alice
2 810nm coupler, axis 1 Alice
3 810nm coupler, axis 2 Alice
4 1550nm coupler, axis 1 Bob
5 1550nm coupler, axis 2 Bob
Table 6.1.: Summary of the SourceStab channels and the data source (count rates) used for
adjusting the piezo actuator
6.1.1. The Hill Climber Algorithm
The Hill Climber algorithm is a very simple heuristic algorithm for searching a local maximum.
It is sketched in ﬁg. 6.1 This algorithm can be easily adapted to our problems1 and seems to be
very suitable to solve them. The procedure starts by moving the piezo motor in one direction
(up). The count rate can follow this change in two ways as shown in ﬁg. 6.1. The SourceStab
software running on PolAlice will apply this simple method consecutively to all six channels in
the order mentioned earlier.
piezo 
steps
countrate
1
2 3
4
(a)
piezo 
steps
countrate
1 2
34
5
(b)
Figure 6.1.: Principle scheme of the Hill-Climber algorithm
(a) The ﬁrst step leads to a higher count rate. Since it is the objection to maximise the
count rate, the coupler will continue to move toward this direction (step 2) until the count
rate is lower than the last step (3). If this happens, the motor goes back one step (4) to get
as close as possible to the maximum.
(b) If the ﬁrst step turns out to be in wrong direction (leads to lower count rates), the
procedure immediately changes the direction until a maximum is found as in case A (steps
2-5).
1The same algorithm is also used to align the entangled state (sec. 6.2) and for detector resynchronisation (sec.
6.4.3).
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For a reliable operation of SourceStab, some additional issues have to be addressed:
 When SourceStab is started, it is assumed that the count rates are not too far away from
the maximum. Any automated version will not work if the count rates are at noise level
(background counts). Therefore, the couplers need to be roughly aligned manually once,
before the source is placed in the ﬁnal 19” housing.
 Since we have to rely on single-photon count rates, a long averaging time is necessary. 10
seconds turned out to be useful.
 The algorithm will not ﬁnd the exact position of the maximum. By reducing the step-size
and running SourceStab periodically, the count rate is however locked very close to the
maximum (within the typical short-term ﬂuctuation of the count rate).
 The whole SourceStab procedure can run without interruption of the QKD process. In fact,
it is the objective of SourceStab to keep the deviations of the count rates and therefore
the inﬂuences on the key rate as small as possible
 During normal operation, the step-size is chosen to 2 piezo-steps (0.4 arc-s). During the
system start-up, the step-size is 6 piezo-steps to retrieve larger deviations faster (e.g. after
transport or long idle time).
6.1.2. Performance Tests
The ﬁnal question of course is: Does SourceStab now work as it should and is it reliable?
For the ﬁrst functional test of SourceStab, we applied manual deviations in an arbitrary direction
on every channel using the piezo remote control. From ﬁgure 6.2 one can see, that SourceStab
manages to retrieve the previous count rate perfectly. In the same manner, SourceStab succeeds
to retrieve the count rate even after transporting the whole QKD setup (see ﬁg. 6.17).
The most important point of course is the long-term stability of the count rates. Figure 6.3 shows
the sum of Alice’s count rates during a 100h test prior to the SECOQC demonstration. One can
see clearly that SourceStab managed to keep the count rates stable. The small remaining ﬂuc-
tuations are due to ﬂuctuations of the crystal temperature controller that aﬀects the production
rate of entangled photons.
32
6.1. Source Stabilisation (SourceStab)
0
5000
10000
0 200 400 600 800
Running time [seconds]
A
lic
e 
C
ou
nt
ra
te
 [1
00
 c
/s
]
B
ob
 C
ou
nt
ra
te
 [c
/s
]
-40
20
80
Pi
ez
o-
St
ep
s 
[a
.u
.]
Alice
Bob
1550nm coupler 1
1550nm coupler 2
810nm coupler 2
810nm coupler 2
mirror 2
mirror 1
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Figure 6.3.: Alice’s count rate (sum of all four detectors) during a 100h test. The points below the
average count rate derive from start-up and alignment processes. Bob’s rates are not added
to the chart because of problems with the long-term stability of the InGaAs-detectors that
will be discussed later (see section 8.4.1).
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6.2. Automatic Alignment of the Entangled State (StateAlign)
The unavoidable random distribution of birefringence in the ﬁbre (quantum channel) will cause
arbitrary unitary transformation of the single photon’s polarisation state. For certain distances
(as long as depolarising eﬀects are negligible2) the induced transformation is unitary and hence
can be completely compensated using polarisation controllers. For a polarisation coded QKD
scheme, precise alignment of the polarisation entangled state is a crucial part.
In our case, the objective is to align a certain maximal entangled Bell-state between Alice and
Bob3:
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉A|H〉B − |H〉A|V 〉B) (6.1)
This entangled state predicts a strong correlation between Alice and Bob: whenever Alice mea-
sures a vertical photon (with a probability of 50%), then Bob will measure a horizontal photon
with certainty. When Alice measures horizontal polarisation, Bob will measure vertical polari-
sation.
To align this state precisely, we make use of the fundamental properties of the state itself.
The probability of measuring both entangled photons in parallel polarisation is (ideally) zero.
Furthermore, this is the only Bell state that is completely rotational symmetric, i.e. it has the
same correlations in every basis. This allows to use the same method to align both bases (H/V
and P/M) that are required for the BBM92 protocol. Since there is no classical equivalent to
entangled quantum states, there is also no classical auxiliary aid like a reference pulse to align
the entangled state. The only way is to use the coincidences itself.
6.2.1. Manual state alignment
The target state 6.1 is aligned in the H/V basis when the polarisation after the quantum channel
is transformed in a way that coincidence rate on the V-detector is (ideally) zero when Alice
triggers 4 only after measuring a vertical photon. In a scenario with realistic detectors, the
minimum coincidence rate is not zero but given by the number of dark counts and accidental
coincidences. After aligning the H/V basis, the same needs to be done for the P/M basis.
In the laboratory prototype of the QKD system, two manual polarisation controllers (so-called
”bat-ears”, see ﬁg. 6.4) were used on Bob’s side to align the entangled state. These consist of
three ﬁbre loops that can be turned with respect to each other and rotate the polarisation state
in any direction.
2see for example [7] for an overview of depolarising eﬀects in ﬁbres
3all postmeasurement analysis on the FPGAs Alice and Bob is prepared for the |Ψ−〉 state
4here, triggering means that Alice sends a sync-pulse
34
6.2. Automatic Alignment of the Entangled State (StateAlign)
The procedure for the manual alignment looks as follows:
1. Unplug all Si-APD detector outputs except channel 0 (V-detector). This will cause Alice
to send trigger pulses only when vertical photons are measured5.
2. Minimise the coincidence rate on the corresponding single-photon detector at Bob (channel
0 - vertical) using the bat-ears of the H/V-base. As mentioned above this will align the
entangled state in the H/V base.
3. Unplug all detector outputs except channel 2 (+45◦detector).
4. Minimise the coincidence-rate on the corresponding single-photon detector at Bob (+45◦)
using the bat-ears of the P/M-base. This will align the P/M base.
Instead of minimizing the corresponding detector, the target-state would also allow to maximize
the opposite detector (e.g maximize the H-detector when Alice triggers only V photons). As
mentioned, the minimum is detector dependent whereas the maximum depends on the attenua-
tion of the quantum channel. Using the minimum has the advantage that it allows to evaluate
the alignment process independent of the ﬁbre losses, i.e. for diﬀerent ﬁbres.
6.2.2. Preparations for the automatic alignment
For a hands-oﬀ QKD system, it is necessary to automatise the whole alignment process. For this
purpose, the manual polarisation controllers were replaced by electronic polarisation controllers
(General Photonics PolaRite II [36], see ﬁg. 6.4). The controllers consist of four piezo-based
squeezers orientated 45◦ with respect to each other. It also includes a DC/DC converter and
high-voltage ampliﬁer accepting analogue inputs from 0 to 5V.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.4.: (a) Manual ”bat-ears” polarisation controller. Three ﬁbre loops are turned with respect to
each other to rotate the polarisation.
(b) PolaRite II polarisation controller module (picture taken from [36]). Four piezo motors
squeeze the ﬁbre and hence induce birefringence rotating the polarisation. The module also
includes a DC/DC converter and high-voltage ampliﬁer accepting analogue inputs.
5note that all other photons are still detected but will not contribute to trigger pulses and hence no coincidences
on Bob’s detectors
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As shown in ﬁgure 5.1, the ﬁrst polarisation controller (PC1) is located before Bob’s ﬁbre-based
BB84 module and is shared with the polarisation control module (PolCtrl) described in the next
chapter. PC1 is used to align the P/M basis. The second polarisation controller PC2 is used to
align the H/V basis i.e. to rotate the measurement axis by 45◦with respect to the P/M basis.
PolBob includes a 12-bit DAC with 8 channels to access all analogue inputs of both polarisation
controllers.
6.2.3. Preliminary tests
Before implementing the automatic alignment procedure on PolBob we made some preliminary
tests with the polarisation controllers to determine suitable step sizes, averaging times etc.
Unfortunately, we discovered signiﬁcant hytereses eﬀects on all channels of the polarisation
controllers as shown in ﬁgure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5.: Coincidence rate on the V-detector when the voltage is changed on one channel of the
polarisation controller. Alice here triggers only on vertical photons. In this scheme, the
H/V basis in the BB84 module acts as a polarisation analyser. One can see that there
is a large diﬀerence in the change of polarisation caused by the polarisation controller for
diﬀerent paths (path A: 0V→4V, path B: 4V→0V) caused by hystersis eﬀects in the PolaRite
controller.
Further tests showed that it is not possible to avoid the hysteresis eﬀect since all channels of
the PolaRite module are aﬀected. However, it is possible to reduce the eﬀect by restricting the
voltage range and step sizes. Furthermore it is important to avoid large voltage jumps. We also
noticed that the diﬀerence in the transformation due to the hysteresis is not equal for every
channel.
This is not a particular problem for the state alignment module because the procedure itself
uses an algorithm (once again the Hill Climber) that tries to keep the voltage-steps as small as
possible and avoids bidirectional jumps on the DAC channel. But it is indeed a problem for the
polarisation control module (PolCtrl) described in the next section.
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6.2.4. Automatic alignment procedure
At the beginning, all eight DAC channels are set to the middle of the range (2V). The procedure
of the automatic version of the alignment process (StateAlign) is in principle very similar to the
manual process:
1. Tell Alice to send trigger pulses only when the detection event comes from the +45◦detector.
For this purpose, electronic switches have been installed on Alice to enable each channel
separately. These switches are accessible using certain QSH commands6.
2. To align the P/M basis, PolBob tries to minimise the count rate of Bob’s +45◦(P) detector
by the using the ﬁrst polarisation controller. Note that every change on PC1 also eﬀects
the H/V basis.
3. Tell Alice to trigger only on vertically measured photons
4. PolBob uses the second polarisation controller to minimise the count rate on the V detector.
This will align the H/V basis.
Note that the order of aligning the bases (P/M, then H/V) is given by the arrangement of the
polarisation controllers (see ﬁg. 5.1).
To ﬁnd the minimum count rate on one detector, the same Hill-Climber algorithm (6.1.1) as
used for SourceStab has been implemented on PolBob. Instead of moving the piezo-channels,
here the voltage on the DAC-channels is changed. Another diﬀerence is that PolBob searches
for a minimum instead of a maximum. The principal scheme stays the same.
PolBob receives the single photon count rate every second from Bob via UDP. If the count
rate is above a certain threshold (150 c/s), larger voltage steps (150mV) and shorter averaging
times (3 seconds) are used. Otherwise PolBob applies small voltage steps (40mV) and uses a
longer averaging time (10 seconds). Initial tests showed that smaller voltage steps or shorter
averaging time can cause wrong behaviour because of the unavoidable ﬂuctuation (noise) of the
count rate. Similar to SourceStab, PolBob will use all four channels of the polarisation controller
consecutively to reach the minimum. An example of an alignment process is shown in ﬁgure 6.6.
The whole alignment process takes about 3 - 5 minutes for one basis. It can happen that the
previously aligned P/M base will drift away during the alignment process of the H/V base. For
example because of mechanical ﬂuctuations in the ﬁbre or temperature changes. Therefore, the
alignment will be repeated for both bases. During the second run, detector speciﬁc thresholds
are introduced. If the count rate on the monitored detector falls below this value, the alignment
process for this basis is considered successful and the remaining DAC channels are skipped. This
will usually reduce the necessary time for aligning the basis to below one minute.
Compared to the manual alignment, the automatic version (StateAlign) takes longer, but it
has several advantages. First of all, it achieves signiﬁcantly more reliable results because of the
6The QSH (Quantum Shell) is an interface to the FPGA registers, a list of commands for the alignment process
is given in [38].
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Figure 6.6.: The implementation of the Hill Climber algorithm allows to minimise the coinci-
dence rate on the target detector (here: V) using all four channels (DAC 1-4) of the
polarisation controller when Alice triggers only vertically measured photons. This
will align the target state |ψ−〉 in the H/V basis.
long averaging time (microprocessors are more patient than humans). Furthermore, the electronic
polarisation controller allows making more accurate changes than the manual controllers because
even slightly touching the polarisation controller applies some pressure on the ﬁbre and will hence
change the polarisation. Another advantage is that this procedure allows to easily align the target
state independent of the relative phase in the entangled state since we use two independent
polarisation controllers for the two bases. The phase does not change the behaviour when both
photons are measured in the H/V basis but changes the correlations of the state in a diﬀerent
basis (e.g. P/M).
6.2.5. Automatic polarisation re-alignment
The PolCtrl module described in the next chapter is used to keep the polarisation stable once
the entangled state is aligned. PolCtrl can compensate polarisation drifts inside the ﬁbre but
not drifts in several other parts in the system. The ﬁbre that connects the 810nm output of
the entanglement source with the free space BB84 module and Bob’s completely ﬁbre based
BB84 module are completely uncompensated and therefore prone to temperature changes. As
a consequence, the polarisation alignment will be lost and the QBER will start to rise. As
pointed out in chapter 8.4, this has been a large problem during the SECOQC demonstration
because the room temperatures changed up to 10◦C within a 24h cycle. The laid-out ﬁbre itself
is rather stable[7]. Using the automated state alignment, even these drifts can be corrected!
For this purpose, the management module (see section 6.5) monitors the QBER and starts the
re-alignment of the state if the QBER rises above a certain threshold (e.g. 1% above the initial
value after the ﬁrst polarisation alignment). The only diﬀerence to the normal alignment process
is that the DAC-channels are not initialised to 2V but start with the previous voltages. Note
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that it is very important that the QKD must not run during the (re-)alignment process! Because
Alice triggers only one detector (V or P) the acquired raw key string would be a sequence of the
same bit (e.g. 1111 ...) which is deﬁnitely not secure.
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6.3. Polarisation Control (PolCtrl)
The module in the previous chapter (StateAlign) described how the desired entangled state is
aligned automatically. In a real world scenario, the laid-out ﬁbre is exposed to several temporal
ﬂuctuations. The birefringence of the ﬁbre causes arbitrary polarisation transformation depend-
ing on environmental factors like temperature and/or mechanical stress. The transformation
in the quantum channel is unitary and hence can be compensated using a singe polarisation
controller at the end of the quantum channel.
Therefore, another stabilisation module is required to compensate the temporal polarisation
drifts of the ﬁbre and keep the quantum channel stable. This requirement has been recognised
already several years ago. Bernhard Schenk developed the ﬁrst prototype of a polarisation control
(PolCtrl) using strong reference pulses within his diploma thesis[6]. This approach has been
further developed by Thorben Kelling[7] and Daniele Ferrini[8].
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Figure 6.7.: Details of the components used for the PolCtrl module
PolAlice includes two reference diodes at 1550nm (the same wavelength as the single photons)
with ﬁxed polarisations (H and P) that are connected to polarisation maintaining ﬁbres, coupled
together using a beam splitter and connected to a ﬁbre switch that is controlled by PolAlice. On
Bob’s side, a 95/5 ﬁbre beam splitter is used to direct a fraction of the light from the quantum
channel to a six-channel polarimeter. The incoming light is devided into three equal parts. Each
part is analysed in the two linear (H/V and P/M) and the circular (R/L) basis. PolBob uses six
photo diodes to measure the power of the components at the outputs and calculates the Stokes
parameters7. The four-channel polarisation controller PC1 is used to keep the polarisation stable.
7a short overview on the description of classical polarisation using the Stokes parameters is given in appendix B
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Figure 6.8.: Principle scheme of PolCtrl on the Poincare´ sphere. PolBob applies eight deviations on the
four inputs of the polarisation controller in the quantum channel. At the end of the cycle,
the state that is closest to the target state is chosen.
6.3.1. Polarisation stabilisation procedure
Details of the polarisation control (PolCtrl) procedure can be found in the diploma thesis men-
tioned above [6, 7, 8]. Here, only the basic procedure of the PolCtrl cycle is sketched:
1. PolBob asks PolAlice to send a pair of reference pulses: horizontal(H) and +45◦(P)
2. PolAlice tells Alice to stop sending trigger pulses and stop QKD using a TTL signal
3. PolAlice switches the quantum channel to the reference diodes
4. PolAlice sends a short horizontal (H) pulse (30ms)
5. PolBob waits for the H-pulse
6. PolBob applies a series of voltages (8 deviations) on the 4 DAC channels of the ﬁrst
polarisation controller during the H-pulse (black lines in ﬁgure 6.8). The voltage is increased
by one step-size (5mV) and decreased by one step-size for each channel consecutively.
7. PolBob measures the polarisation of the initial state (green point in ﬁgure 6.8) and after
each deviation. He calculates a set of Stokes parameters for all nine states.
8. PolAlice sends a short +45◦(P) pulse (30ms)
9. PolBob applies the same series of voltages during the P-pulse and obtains another set of
Stokes parameters.
10. PolBob calculates the deviation angles to the target state for all nine voltage settings for
each pulse separately
11. PolBob applies the voltage that corresponds to the smallest angular distance to the target
state (blue point in ﬁg. 6.8). Note that the distance for both consecutive reference pulses
(H and P) to the target state must be minimised. For each pulse, a separate target state is
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deﬁned. Therefore, the common deviation is calculated for all nine points: θi =
√
θ2H,i + θ
2
P,i
where θ2H,i is the angular distance between the H-pulse and H-target for deviation number
i. The voltage at the end of the PolCtrl cycle is set to the smallest common deviation.
12. PolBob requests more reference pulses dependent on the deviation angle to the target state
and repeats the steps 1-11
13. PolAlice waits some time, switches the quantum channel back to the entanglement source
and tells Alice to continue QKD
The whole cycle takes about 250ms. To stabilise the channel, the complete cycle needs to be
repeated periodically. Too fast repetition rates will decrease the ﬁnal key rate because the QKD
needs to be stopped during the cycle. Short-term ﬂuctuations (e.g. when somebody touches the
ﬁbre) can be covered when the QBER is monitored by the management module (see section 6.5).
6.3.2. Measuring the target state
The previous version of PolCtrl was based on keeping a predeﬁned target state. The polarisation
state of the reference diodes should be mapped to the same state after transmission.
H −→ H =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
1
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ P −→ P =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
1
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (6.2)
After the ﬁrst PolCtrl cycle, the entangled state was aligned manually as described in the last
chapter. This is not applicable any more since the ﬁrst polarisation controller is shared by the
state alignment module StateAlign and PolCtrl. Hence, the target state on the polarimeter will
be an arbitrary state after the polarisation entangled state is aligned.
A procedure to measure the target states immediately after the state alignment is therefore
necessary:
1. Renormalisation (see next paragraph)
2. Request a long pair of reference pulses (each one second) from PolAlice
3. Measure the polarisation of both pulses at the ﬁbre output by averaging over the whole
duration of the reference pulse.
4. Set the measured states as the new target states
In the normal start-up sequence of the QKD system, the actual QKD is started immediately
after the target state is measured to avoid further polarisation drifts.
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6.3.3. New renormalisation procedure
Before calculating the stokes parameters from the diode voltages, one needs to normalise the
receiver diodes (see [7] for details). This is done by requesting a pair of reference pulses (each
3.5s) and searching for a minimum on each photo diode (having a minimum on one diode, e.g.
V, corresponds to a maximum on the opposite diode in this basis, e.g. H). The minimum and
maximum voltages are stored and later used to calculate the normalised stokes parameters (see
appendix B, eqn. B.7).
At the end of the procedure, the DAC voltages are restored to the original values to obtain the
same polarisation transformation as before the normalisation. Unfortunately, this is not possible
in practice because of the hysteresis in the PolaRite polarisation controller. The last step will
always lead to a diﬀerent transformation away from the target state.
It is evident, that the normalisation should be carried out before the target state is measured.
If not even the target state is correctly measured, the polarisation control is doomed to fail-
ure. Unfortunately, we noticed that the normalisation procedure destroys the previously aligned
state because of the problem mentioned in the previous paragraph. Since temperature ﬂuctua-
tion change the bias voltage of PolBob’s receiver diodes, a periodic re-normalisation is however
necessary. This brings us in a dilemma: we cannot use the normalisation procedure because of
the problem with the hysteresis which leads to unwanted changes in the polarisation and hence
higher QBER. On the other hand, we need to execute normalisations periodically and always
before measuring the target state.
Therefore, a new approach for the periodic re-normalisation is implemented in this thesis: Since
minimum and maximum are related to the bias voltage of the ampliﬁer, the idea is to use the bias
voltage itself to handle temperature ﬂuctuations. Only the initial normalisation values obtained
at the system start-up are kept.
The new renormalisation procedure measures the bias voltage when the ﬁbre is dark (i.e. no clas-
sical light pulses). The minimum and maximum voltages acquired during start-up-normalisation
are subsequently adjusted parallel to changes of the bias voltage. E.g. when the bias voltage
of a certain detector changes by 50mV, we assume that minimum and maximum voltages also
change by 50mV in the same direction.
A test measurement over 60 hours supports this approach. During the measurement, minima and
maxima determined by the normalisation routine drifted parallel to the bias voltage as shown
in ﬁg. 6.9. The maximum changes slightly more then the bias voltage since the ampliﬁcation
factor is also temperature dependent. This can be considered by using a constant factor when
the maxima are changed.
This way of renormalisation allows to avoid the large jump on the DAC channels that occurs
after the normalisation procedure. Furthermore, the bias voltages can be measured during normal
QKD operation, single photons will not inﬂuence the receiver diodes of the polarimeter.
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Figure 6.9.: Detector bias voltage compared to minimum and maximum voltage acquired by the nor-
malisation procedure during a 60h test run
6.3.4. Laboratory tests
We tested the polarisation stabilisation module by putting the ﬁbre spool outside a window to
simulate the real-world temperature inﬂuence on the ﬁbre. Alice and Bob were placed in a room
with stable temperature to rule out the temperature inﬂuence on the synchronisation circuits.
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Figure 6.10.: Visibility and temperature during a test with a 25km ﬁbre spool placed outside a window.
(a) Visibility and temperature for test run without PolCtrl.
(b) repeated measurement with PolCtrl turned on.
The visibility is deﬁned as V = max−minmax+min where max is the maximal coincidence rate for or-
thogonal polariser settings8 at Alice and Bob and min the minimal coincidence rate for parallel
polariser settings.
First, we made a (short) run without PolCtrl. One can see the large inﬂuence of the temperature
on the visibility. Even a small change in temperature (∼1.5◦C) completely destroys the entangled
state within 15 minutes.
8The state-align module aligns the state to |ψ−〉. Hence the maximal coincidence rate is obtained for orthogonal
polariser settings.
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We repeated the measurement with PolCtrl turned on. The visibility stayed stable around 90%
although the temperature changed more than during the ﬁrst run (∼7◦C). The remaining spikes
are believed to result from the hysteresis eﬀects in the polarisation controller.
6.3.5. Open problems
One disadvantage (among others) in the current approach for polarisation stabilisation is that
PolCtrl relies on applying the same voltage series on two consecutive reference pulses. In the
current scheme, eight voltage steps are applied on the controller channels. After each deviation,
the voltage is put back the initial value before the cycle. For example, the pattern which is
applied to every channel looks like 2V → 2.05V → 2V → 1.95V → 2V.
The authors of the original scheme [6, 7, 8] assumed, that the polarisation controller applies
the same transformation when the same voltage is applied, i.e. applies the same transformation
before and after the voltage step. Due to the hysteresis of the PolaRite controller this is not
possible for even one step, not to mention sixteen consecutive steps.
On the other hand it not possible to use only one reference pulse. If one point on the Poincar
sphere is ﬁxed it is still possible to rotate the whole sphere around the axis deﬁned by the origin
and the ﬁxed point itself. Due to the two-basis concept of QKD, the whole sphere needs to be
stabilised. Therefore, it is inevitable to ﬁx two points on the sphere, i.e. use two non-orthogonal
reference pulses.
The previous version of PolCtrl used a distance dependent step multiplier to increase the voltage
steps if the state is far away from the target. Certainly this is rather counterproductive because
larger voltage steps will also expose the hystersis eﬀects more. Instead of using a variable step
size, we now use more pulses to get closer to the target state. This approach takes a bit longer
but leads to signiﬁcantly better results.
Figure 6.11 shows the behaviour of PolCtrl during the two-weeks demonstration of the SECOQC
network. One can identify three problems:
 The normalisation procedure does not work always correctly (normalised stokes parameters
should be smaller than 1)
 From hour 171 to 173.5, the polarisation measured at the polarimeter was very stable.
Nevertheless, the management module initialised a realignment of the entangled state
because the QBER reached the threshold (see sec. 6.5.3). This behaviour has been expected
because the large temperature deviations in Bob’s room leads to polarisation drifts in parts
of the system that cannot be stabilised.
 PolCtrl fails to keep the target state during the hours 174.5 and 177. One can see that the
distance to the target state steadily increases. At the moment, we believe that this is due
to the inherent problem with the hysteresis that leads to the misbehaviour. Again, it is
the management module that recognises the increased QBER and starts a re-alignment of
the entangled state.
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Figure 6.11.: Stokes parameters and the distance to the target state during the SECOQC test phase.
The zero-point on the x-axis is referred to October 8th 2008, the date of the SECOQC
conference.
Tests with rather large external inﬂuences on the ﬁbre, e.g. mechanically moving the ﬁbre or
putting the ﬁbre under strong temperature changes showed that PolCtrl works ﬁne in principle.
However, the problem seems to be at smaller changes around a stable polarisation as it is in the
laid-out ﬁbre. In this case, the hysteresis becomes the dominant eﬀect and leads to an unwanted
drift in the polarisation.
At the moment, the second largest problem of the current approach (beside the hysteresis) is that
drifts in several optical components cannot be compensated (see section 6.2.5). This especially
is a problem in an environment without temperature stabilisation. From ﬁg. 6.11, one can see
that the target state after the re-alignment of the entangled state changes a lot during a period
of six hours. The polarisation drifts in the laid-out ﬁbre we used for the SECOQC network
demonstration were however signiﬁcantly lower on a 24h period9. We believe that this is because
of the temperature inﬂuences on the ﬁbre-based BB84 module which cannot be compensated by
PolCtrl.
We furthermore recognised a high QBER peak immediately after the PolCtrl cycle. This comes
along with a peak on the detection rate on Bob’s side. We believe that the strong reference pulse
(95% of the reference pulse enter the BB84 module, only a fraction of 5% enters the polarimeter)
heat up the InGaAs diodes (which are not triggered but stay in linear mode) leading to higher
dark count rates for a short time. The only way to prevent this QBER peak is to set the delay
9See for example [7] where several polarisation measurements of the ﬁbre links are shown.
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time suﬃciently long (∼150ms) before PolAlice switches the quantum channel back to the source.
This blocks the quantum channel and hence the QKD process for a longer time than the actual
reference pulses (150ms vs. 60ms).
Presently, the possibility of automatically re-aligning the entangled state allow to compensate
the problems described above when the QBER starts to rise. However, there are some alternative
approaches that should be tested:
 General Photonics suggests [39] to drive the controller with direction dependent diﬀerent
voltage steps to overcome the hysteresis problem.
 Drive every voltage needed for the polarisation control over the same path. This would
take signiﬁcantly longer and therefore also block the quantum channel for a longer time.
 A completely diﬀerent approach on the polarisation control issue like a QBER based algo-
rithm described in sec. 9.3.
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6.4. Detector Synchronisation (FindDelay/FindWindow)
The gate width of Bob’s InGaAs detectors should be as short as possible (∼1ns) to reduce
unwanted detection events (dark counts and accidental coincidences). This requires absolute
precise timing to synchronise the gate with the arrival of the photon. On a long-term scale,
temperature ﬂuctuations have an eﬀect on the runtime of the electronic trigger pulses in Alice
and Bob10 leading to a loss of count rates. Therefore, periodic resynchronisation is necessary.
(a) (b)
Trigger Pulse
 (1610nm)
Bob: Trigger out (TTL)
Det. Gate
Det. Out (TTL)
tdb
tdd
tresp
tacw
Trigger Pulse
 (1610nm)
Bob: Trigger out (TTL)
Det. Gate
Det. Out (TTL)
tdb
tdd
tacw
tdrift2
tdrift1
tgw
Single Photon 
 (1550nm)
Single Photon 
 (1550nm)
Time Time
Arrives at photodiode
Hits detector Hits detector
Arrives at photodiode
Figure 6.12.: Timing sequence for detector synchronisation on Bob’s side
(a) In the ﬁbre, the optical trigger pulse follows the single photon. After the arrival of the
optical trigger pulse, the TTL output (from Bob to detector) is delayed individually for
every detector (tdb). The gate on the APD is applied after some internal delay (tdd). The
gate width tgw is about 1.5ns. If the detector is synchronised perfectly, the photon arrives
in the centre of the detector gate. tresp is the response time of the detector (∼20ns), tacw
is the auxiliary coincidence window which is explained later.
(b) A drift in the trigger-circuits in Alice tdrift1 and/or Bob tdrift2 delays the trigger pulse
and cause the photon to fall out of the gate. The photon will not be detected. Hence, a
re-sychronisation is necessary. In this example, the internal delay and the positions for the
auxiliary coincidence window need to be adapted.
To accomplish the required precision for detector synchronisation, Alice and Bob include indi-
vidual delay lines with a resolution of 10ps and a range of 10ns for each detector channel.
 On Alice, the optical trigger pulse is delayed after a detector event arrived from the Si-APD
modules (TTL). For each detector channel an individual delay line is available.
 On Bob, the arriving trigger pulse is delayed individually before it is passed to the detector’s
gate input (TTL).
10During the SECOQC demonstration, we experienced a ﬂuctuation of about 120 ps/degree and a total ﬂuctuation
of about 1.2ns on a 24h scale, see ﬁg. 6.14
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6.4.1. Delay adjustment
The chromatic dispersion of the ﬁbre will cause the trigger pulse (1610nm) to lag behind the
single photon (1550nm). Table 6.2 gives an overview of the time-diﬀerence between trigger pulse
and photon caused by dispersion in diﬀerent ﬁbres.
For example, when the 25km ﬁbre spool (NZDS, non-zero dispersion shifted ﬁbre) used for lab-
oratory tests is replaced by the 16km ﬁbre between Siemensstrasse (SIE) and Erdberg (ERD)11,
one needs to compensate an additional 11.7ns. This is more then the range of the electronic
delay lines (10ns). Therefore, we use a delay ﬁbre in Alice for a coarse delay adjustment. In the
example above, a 2m (10ns) piece of ﬁbre is suitable. Note that the delay ﬁbre is the only (!)
element in the complete QKD system that needs to be adapted when the length of the quantum
channel is changed. Unfortunately it is not yet possible to replace the delay ﬁbre with a diﬀerent
delay chip with a longer range or a concatenation of the already used type due to the increase
of timing jitter.
Fibre Dispersion Coeﬀ.
[ps/nm/km]
Total Dispersion
[ns]
25km NZDS 5 7,5
50km NZDS 5 15,0
75km NZDS 5 22,5
16km Standard 20 19,2
32km Standard 20 38,4
Table 6.2.: Time diﬀerence caused by dispersion between single photon (1550nm) and trigger
pulse (1610nm) for some ﬁbre links. The 16km link is the one we have used during
the SECOQC conference.
The delay lines on Alice and Bob are accessible over the QSH (Quantum Shell), an interface to
the FPGA registers. At the beginning of 2008, the QSH commands had to be entered manually
to a certain QSH-File. This is very impracticable even for a laboratory environment. Every time
a delay line needs to be adjusted (e.g. due to temperature changes), the QSH ﬁles had to be
changed and the QKD restarted consecutively. To ﬁnd the best delay value (highest count rates)
several restarts lasting for several minutes were necessary.
We therefore developed the QKD Control Client. A program written in Java that allows to adjust
several parameters like the delay-lines, the position of the time-window (see next section), size
of the sifted key etc. in a very convenient way. In combination with the QKD Monitor (see sec.
A.2), the QKD Control Client furthermore allows to automatically ﬁnd the correct delay to
achieve maximum count rates.
Although very convenient, this way of detector synchronisation has some disadvantages:
 The QKD Control Client uses the count rates that the QKD Monitor receives from Bob
11This is the ﬁbre link we have used during the SECOQC network demonstration
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Figure 6.13.: The QKD Control Client, a program written in Java allows to set the delay lines
on Alice and Bob, to enable detector channels on Alice and to set the auxiliary
coincidence windows on Bob
and tries to maximise the count rates sending commands to Bob. It is obvious that the
whole procedure could run directly on Bob without further communication12.
 The QKD Monitor is - as the name suggests - a monitoring program and should not be
used as a part of the automation/stabilisation procedures.
 It is not possible to integrate the QKD Control Client in the overall system architecture
of the QKD system where every module is coordinated by the mangement module (see
section 6.5).
In collaboration with the Austrian Research Centers a program called FindDelay has been devel-
oped. It is running directly on Bob and scans the whole delay-range and searches for a maximal
count rate. In a second run, a smaller range (1ns) around the maxima and longer averaging times
are used to precisely locate the maximum. FindDelay is able to scan all four detectors parallel
and takes about 90 seconds. Figure 6.14 shows the coincidence rates on Bob’s detectors during
the FindDelay search.
To achieve a precise synchronisation between photon and detector gate, the delay lines on Bob
are used. Each detector needs to be adjusted individually because of slightly diﬀerent runtimes
inside the detector. This is a very important step, not just to achieve a high count rate but also
12The QKD system already requires a lot of communication between the components (Alice, Bob, PolAlice,
PolBob), we therefore tried to avoid unnecessary communication
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Figure 6.14.: Top: Coincidence rates (H and V) during the FindDelay run at 25◦C. One can see that
the detectors have a timing-mismatch of about 500ps caused by diﬀerences in the internal
delay. Without precise timing, the diﬀerence would make the QKD system prone to the
time-shift attack (see section 9.4.3).
Bottom: FindDelay-run at 15◦C. The temperature diﬀerence causes a drift in the runtime
of the trigger-circuits of 1.2ns. The decrease of the peak coincidence rate results from a
temperature dependence of the idQuantique detectors (see sec. 8.4.1)
to counter several side channel attacks. The ﬁrst technically feasible side channel attacks expose
unequal timing adjustment to make the detectors distinguishable13.
6.4.2. Auxiliary coincidence window (FindWindow)
The primary coincidence window is of course the gate of the InGaAs detector. During the tests
in the laboratory, we used a detector build by the KTH Stockholm that has a rather broad
and ﬁxed gate width of about 5ns. Therefore, this detector is more prone to dark counts and
accidental coincidences than the id200 detectors (with a gate of ∼1.5ns). We can however use
an auxiliary coincidence window to ﬁlter out a fraction of the unwanted coincidence events. The
incoming trigger pulse starts a time-tagging unit (TTU) with a resolution of 82ps built by the
Austrian Research Centers (ARC). Only the coincidence events from the detector that arrive
within a certain time-window will be considered. All other events will be ignored.
To set the time window correctly, the time-distribution of the detector output has to be measured
ﬁrst. Thus, Bob measures the time between the arrival of the trigger pulse and the detection
event in time-tagging units (82ps). In a special histogram-mode, Bob will create a histogram
containing the number of coincidences arrived per time-tagging unit (TTU). The histogram can
be analysed to ﬁnd the centre of the auxiliary coincidence window. To avoid side channel attacks,
the coincidence window must have the same width for every detector channel.
Similar to the situation for the delay-lines, the coincidence windows have to be set using certain
13This attack and it’s implications on our system will be discussed in a later section 9.4
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QSH-commands. For the laboratory prototype, the QKD Control Client allowed to analyse the
coincidence histogram created by Bob and subsequently sets the coincidence window automat-
ically. Alternatively, the coincidence window can be set manually for each detector. In collab-
oration with the Austrian Research Centers, the FindWindow program has been developed. It
automatically generates the coincidence histogram for every channel, analyses the histogram and
sets the coincidence window with a given width around the maximum.
Since FindDelay and FindWindow run directly on Bob, both procedures can be integrated into
the management module architecture (see section 6.5). The management module coordinates
the complete QKD system and will be described in the next chapter.
6.4.3. Periodic delay re-synchronisation
As mentioned above, the runtime of the trigger circuits is temperature dependent. Therefore
a periodic re-synchronisation is necessary to compensate drifts (see ﬁg. 6.12). In this mode,
FindDelay searches locally for higher count rates. The position of the auxiliary coincidence
window are moved parallel to the delay-drift. To compensate the temperature ﬂuctuations, it is
suﬃcient to run the FindDelay re-synchronisation every 10 minutes.
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6.5. Management Module
With the modules described in the last sections, we are able to:
 Automatically adjust and stabilise the entanglement source to maximal count rates (SourceS-
tab)
 Automatically align the desired entangled state (StateAlign)
 Automatically synchronise the InGaAs detector gates with the arriving photons (FindDe-
lay/FindWindow)
 Keep the polarisation stable at the ﬁbre output (PolCtrl)
To achieve a hands-oﬀ start-up, stable and automatic operation of the QKD system, a precise
and reliable coordination of the modules is required. For these purposes we have conceived
the so-called management module (MM) in collaboration with the Austrian Research Centers.
Technical details can be found in the speciﬁcation document [38]. It is a master-slave state
machine (Alice is master), that runs on the node computers. An overview of the management
module’s tasks is given here.
Software
Hardware
Optics
Polarisation StabilisationSource Stabilisation State Alignment Detector Synchronisation
Management Module
PolAlice PolBob Bob
Entanglement
Source Single Photon DetectorsPolarimeter
Monitoring
Alice
Reference
Diodes
Polarization
Controllers
Information flowControl flow
Figure 6.15.: Overview of the architecture of the management module (MM). The MM will coordinate
and control all other components in the QKD system.
The MM has to take care that only one module is running at a time. The correct operation of
the modules is not possible when two modules work in parallel. For example: a PolCtrl cycle
stops Alice for a fraction of a second because the quantum channel is switched to the reference
diodes. This leads to a lower count rate for a short time and hence could cause a wrong behaviour
of SourceStab, FindDelay, FindWindow and StateAlign. In some cases, the situation gets even
more complicated because several components are involved and the control structures between
them have to be considered. For example, ﬁgure 6.16 shows the sequence diagram for a complete
state alignment procedure. Again, it is the MM that takes care of the correct order. Similar
sequence diagrams for the other modules can be found in MM speciﬁcation [38].
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Trigger V only
Bob MMAlice Alice MM
Start StateAlignment
For H/V basis START StateAlign 0
Minimise V-Counts
(Countrates from Bob)
FinishedFinished
Trigger P only
Start StateAlignment
for +/- basis START StateAlign 2
FinishedFinished
Minimise P-Counts
(Countrates from Bob)
Trigger V only
Start StateAlignment
for H/V basis START StateAlign 0
Minimise V-Counts
(Countrates from Bob)
Finished
Finished
Trigger P only
Start StateAlignment
for +/- basis START StateAlign 2
FinishedFinished
Minimise P-Counts
(Countrates from Bob)
Request long reference pulse
PolAlice
Meaure Target State
for PolCtrl
PolBob
Trigger all detectors
Stop QKD Stop QKD
Start QKD Start QKD
Figure 6.16.: Sequence diagram for the state alignment module (see section 6.2). During the whole
process, Bob sends his coincidence rates every second to PolBob.
6.5.1. Start-up process
The management module coordinates all components that are necessary for a hands-oﬀ start-
up of the QKD system. For the start-up process, the correct sequence is very important. As
an example, SourceStab will not work correctly if the detector synchronisation (FindDelay,
FindWindow) is not completed. The sequence looks as follows:
1. Start Alice and Bob (without QKD)
2. Is-alive check for PolAlice and PolBob
3. FindDelay (global version for full delay-scan)
4. FindWindow
5. SourceStab (quick mode with larger steps)
6. PolCtrl normalisation
7. StateAlign (includes measuring the target state)
8. Start QKD
A typical start-up takes about 15-20 minutes. Even after transporting the complete system, the
start-up takes not more than 25 minutes (see ﬁg. 6.17). Because of the frequent restarts of the
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nodes during the SECOQC demonstration, we usually skip SourceStab (in quick start mode)
when the system is restarted. This reduces the time for a restart of the system to about 10 min.
6.5.2. Normal QKD operation
As pointed out in the previous chapters, some of the modules need to run periodically to guar-
antee a stable key generation. Therefore, the management module will call the modules in a
certain sequence:
1. FindDelay (resynchronisation)
2. SourceStab (small step size)
3. PolCtrl renormalisation
4. Ten PolCtrl cycles with an interval of 10 seconds
5. Ten PolCtrl cycles with an interval of 30 seconds
This basic cycle takes about 10 minutes will be repeated in an inﬁnite loop, until an error occurs.
6.5.3. Error handling
The stabilisation modules are conceived to compensate most of the real-life ﬂuctuations. How-
ever, some eﬀects cannot be compensated within the normal cycle. In some cases, the MM can
detect the problem and try to handle it. In some cases, the key generation needs to be stopped
because the security of the key cannot be guaranteed any more (e.g. when one of the detectors
fails). The link operator will be informed via e-mail if it is not possible to solve the problem
automatically. Here is a list of error scenarios that are currently covered by the management
module:
 When somebody incidentally touches the ﬁbre, the QBER will suddenly increase. In this
case, the MM stops the normal operation cycle and immediately starts several PolCtrl
cycles to compensate the change as fast as possible. If this does not help, the MM initiates
a re-alignment of the entangled state.
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, temperature ﬂuctuations in Bob will lead to po-
larisation drifts that cannot be compensated by PolCtrl. In addition, PolCtrl is not able
to compensate all drifts in the ﬁbre because of the hystersis in the polarisation controller.
Both eﬀects will lead to a slow rise of the QBER. Therefore, the management module mea-
sures the QBER immediately after the start-up. If the QBER exceeds a certain threshold
(start-value + 1%), a re-alignment of the entangled state is started which brings the QBER
back again to a low value 14.
14During the SECOQC demonstration, where no air-conditioning has been available and the temperature ﬂuctu-
ated heavily, a re-aligned was necessary on average every 2.5 hours
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 When one of the synchronisation pulses is missed, the measurement results will become
totally uncorrelated. The QBER jumps immediately to 50% (± 1%). The management
module should notice this as fast as possible and re-synchronise Alice and Bob by restarting
the QKD scripts only.
 Furthermore, the management module monitors the count rates of all eight detectors and
the temperature of the crystal. Of course, a failure of one of these components cannot be
compensated. The MM can however inform the operator of the QKD link via e-mail about
these failures15.
6.5.4. Hands-oﬀ Plug&Play Start of the complete QKD System
The combination of the modules in the previous chapter with the MM allows us to achieve a
complete hands-oﬀ plug&play operation of the QKD system. Figure 6.17 shows the coincidence
rate of the vertical detector and the QBER during a start-up process after the complete system
was moved from the Siemens locations to the Austrian Research Centers. One can see that the
complete system was automatically aligned and started to produce keys after 22 min without any
manual intervention. Note that it took much longer to connect all cables, start the computers
etc.
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Figure 6.17.: Hands-oﬀ start-up process after the QKD system has been transported through Vienna
(from Siemens to the Austrian Research Centers). The modules described above (Find-
Delay, FindWindow, SourceStab, StateAlign) completely align the whole QKD system.
The ﬁrst keys are generated after about 22 minutes. A normal startup (no transportation)
takes about 12-15 minutes. One can see that the coincidence rate at the end of the complete
startup is higher than after source stabilisation. This is because of the warm-up time of
the pump laser and the crystal temperature controller for the entanglement source. Note
that this phase takes almost as long as the startup of the QKD system!
15For this purpose, the QKD Monitor software includes an interface which allows to send automated e-mails
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This chapter presents several experimental results from the laboratory and the ﬁrst ﬁeld trials
in the Siemens network before the system has been integrated into the SECOQC network.
7.1. Pump power
After the entanglement source is integrated into the ﬁnal 19” case, it is not possible to access
it any more. We therefore made several measurements (using optical ﬁbres) with various pump
power settings to ﬁnd the optimum value. The result can be seen in ﬁgure 7.1. The overall
coincidence probability (ratio between count rate on Alice and coincidence rate on Bob) is
about 4% and stays constant.
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Figure 7.1.: (a) Key rate and QBER at various pump power settings. (b) Alice’s count rate (sum of all
four detectors) and Bob’s coincidence rate at various pump power settings.
From ﬁgure 7.1, one can also see that the key rate ﬁrst increases with the pump power, has
a maximum at about 10mW and ﬁnally decreases for higher power. This behaviour has two
reasons: ﬁrst, the count rates do not increase linearly with the pump power but show a saturation
behaviour. This is because of the hold-oﬀ times of the detectors which is necessary to reduce
the so-called afterpulsing eﬀect. This is a detection event caused by a trapped charge carrier
that is released later and causes a new avalanche. The second reason is the rising QBER which
is linearly increasing with the pump power. The reason for this particular behaviour will be
discussed in the next section. Because of the error correction protocol and privacy ampliﬁcation
process, any increase of the QBER will automatically reduce the size of the secure key. One
therefore has to ﬁnd a compromise between a high key rate and a low QBER which will rise
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Figure 7.2.: Decomposition of the QBER for several pump power settings into three components: ac-
cidental coincidences (multi-pair emission), system errors (optical imperfections) and dark
counts.
with longer distances. We decided to set the pump power to 6mW when the system is integrated
into the 19”-case.
7.2. QBER Decomposition
In a practical QKD system, some errors will occur even when no eavesdropper is present. We
can distinguish four error sources for our entanglement based system:
 Detector dark counts
 Accidental coincidences due to muti-pair emission
 System errors (other errors covering imperfections in the optical elements such as beam
splitters and purity of the entangled state)
 Polarisation drifts
To obtain the relative percentage of the various sources, we ﬁrst measured the dark count and
accidental coincidence rates for each detector. The dark count rate can be obtained by blocking
the detectors input. Adding some delay in the trigger path allows to measure the background
noise that consists of accidental coincidences and dark counts. The accidental coincidences are
caused by multi-pair emission during the spontaneous down conversion process [30]. All mea-
surements were made immediately after the state has been aligned carefully to rule out errors
due to polarisation drifts and hence this error source was considered negligible.
During the laboratory tests, the QKD software for Alice and Bob was running on a central
computer. Additional software allowed to analyse the coincidences after sifting, i.e. to obtain the
coincidence matrix. By subtracting the dark counts from the original matrix one can estimate
the QBER due to dark counts. The same can be done to obtain the QBER component due
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to accidental coincidences. By subtracting both dark count rate and the accidental coincidence
rate, we can obtain the remaining error caused by imperfect optical elements (“System error”).
Figure 7.2 shows the result for several pump power settings. The QBER increases linearly with
the pump power due to multi-pair emissions from the down-conversion process. The multi-
pairs are largely unrelated and give therefore uncorrelated results. Since the multi-pairs grow
quadratically with the pump power as opposed to the linear increase of the single pair coinci-
dences, the QBER increases linearly. One can see that the QBER component caused by dark
counts (∼0.44%) and imperfections of the optical components (“QBER System”, ∼0.63%) are -
as expected - independent from the pump power.
7.2.1. Dark counts
As we will see in the next chapter, the dark count rate becomes dominant for long distances.
The limiting factor is the ratio between entanglement related coincidences and dark counts. We
therefore made several investigations of the dark count rates of our four detectors. We expected
that the dark count rate increased linear with the trigger (gating) rate. Our measurements (ﬁgure
7.3) conﬁrm this expectation.
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Figure 7.3.: Dark count rates for our detectors for various trigger rates
Table 7.1 summarises some properties of our detectors. Note that all dark count values are
obtained after the auxiliary coincidence window which ﬁlters about 40% of the dark counts of
the KTH detector but has almost no eﬀect on the idQuantique detectors. The KTH detector has
very good properties (dark count probability) but requires external water cooling and several
power supplies. It is hence not applicable for the SECOQC demonstration where all QKD devices
should ﬁt into a 19-inch rack. The KTH detector alone would require a single 19-inch rack. We
therefore borrowed a fourth id200 detector for the SECOQC demonstration.
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Detector Gate width Dark count probability
idQuantique id200 single mode 1 ∼1.5ns 3.9 · 10−6 per gate
idQuantique id200 single mode 2 ∼1.5ns 1.0 · 10−4 per gate
idQuantique id200 multi mode ∼1.5ns 1.9 · 10−4 per gate
KTH Sweden ∼5ns 1.8 · 10−5 per gate
Table 7.1.: Summary of the measured dark count probability for our detectors
7.3. Long distance measurements
The dependency of the key rate on the distance and the maximum distance of the QKD system
is inherently interesting. Before we started the measurements, we wanted to know the expected
key rate for a certain distance and also the maximum distance. The attenuation of the ﬁbre
reduces the coincidence rate and raw key rate. Since the dark count rate is independent of the
attenuation, the reduced coincidence rate also eﬀects the ratio between coincidences and noise
and hence the QBER. Therefore, the dark count rate of the detectors becomes the dominant
factor at long distances.
A simple model allows calculating the expected QBER and key rate for diﬀerent distances. The
attenuation in the ﬁbre reduces the coincidence rate on each detector
c(l) = c010−α·l/10 (7.1)
where c0 is the average coincidence rate between Alice and Bob at zero distance, α is the
attenuation in dB per kilometre of the ﬁbre and l the length of the ﬁbre in km.
In the same way, the accidental coincidences caused by multi pair emission are attenuated
a(l) = a010−α·l/10 (7.2)
where a0 is the accidental coincidence rate at zero distance.
The total coincidence rate therefore is 4c(l) and the total background rate is 4a(l) + 4d where d
is the average dark count rate per InGaAs detector.
The QBER is deﬁned as:
e =
nfalse
ntrue + nfalse
(7.3)
After sifting, the true bits are given by the half of the coincidence rate (2c(l)) and a quarter
of the total background rate (a(l) + d). The false bits are given by just a quarter of the total
background rate (a(l) + d). The length dependent QBER caused by background coincidences
(dark counts and accidental coincidences) therefore results in
enoise(l) =
nfalse
ntrue + nfalse
(7.4)
=
a(l) + d
2c(l) + 2d + 2a(l)
(7.5)
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To consider the imperfections in the optical setup (“system errors”), we add another QBER
component esystem ≈ 0.65% (the value is obtained from the measurements in the previous sub-
chapter). The complete QBER is therefore:
e(l) = enoise(l) + esystem (7.6)
The ﬁnal key rate can be calculated with eqn. 4.6 for the number of secure bits nsecure(e),
including the error dependent overhead for the CASCADE error correction.
ksec(l) =
nsecure(e(l))
nsifted
· 4c(l)
2
(7.7)
=
4c(l)
2
[1− τ(e)− f(e) · h(e)] (7.8)
The factor nsecure(e(l))nsifted gives the number of secure bits per sifted bit where (4
c(l)
2 ) is the overall
sifting rate.
Figure 7.4 shows the expected key rate compared to experimental results (at 0km, 25km, 50km).
It also shows a prediction for an average dark count rate of about 4 Hz which corresponds to
the value of our best InGaAs detector (id200 SM1, see table 7.1). During all measurements,
the pump power was set to about 6mW with a single count rate on Alice (which is equal to
the trigger rate) of about 950 kHz. The other parameters for the model are: α = 0.2db/km,
c0 = 9kHz and a0 = 240Hz.
1
10
100
1000
10000
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Fibre length [km]
se
cu
re
 K
ey
ra
te
 [b
ps
]
(b)
(a)
Figure 7.4.: The expected key rate for an average dark count rate of 80 Hz (a) and the experimental
values (blue squares). (b) shows the expected key rate for an average dark count rate of 4
Hz, which corresponds to our best InGaAs detector
One can see from ﬁgure 7.4 and table 7.2 that the measurements perfectly match the predictions
made by the simple model given above. The large average dark count rate (80Hz) of the diﬀerent
detectors we use does not allow a key generation after 65km. An almost twice longer maximum
distance is technically feasible. If we assume to have four detectors with the same dark count
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Distance
[km]
QBER
(Model)
QBER (Mea-
sured)
Key rate
(Model)
Key rate
(Measured)
0 2.3 2.3 12494 12500
25 3.2 3.3 3306 3300
50 5.9 6.0 554 550
75 13.0 13.2 0 0
Table 7.2.: Comparison of the values (QBER, key rate) as expected from the model and experimental
results
rate as the best detector we have now (4 Hz, id200 SM1), we can reach distances beyond 100km.
The predicted key rate at 100km is approximately 90 bps.
Note that the entanglement source has already been used to distribute entangled photons over
100km [35]. The results herein were obtained with the detector with the lowest dark count
rate. The problem is that QKD requires four detectors and several optical components (BB84
modules, WDM, PolCtrl) adding further attenuation.
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7.4. First long term measurements
In April 2008, we made the ﬁrst long-term measurements with the QKD system. All measure-
ments presented on the next pages were carried out with SourceStab (sec. 6.1) and PolCtrl (sec.
6.3) only. The other stabilisation and automation modules were conceived because of the expe-
riences during the following measurements. Figure 7.5 shows key rate and QBER for a 12h run
with a 25km ﬁbre spool (non-zero dispersion shifted) in the laboratory.
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Figure 7.5.: Results of a 12h trial in laboratory environment. (a) Keyrate and QBER (b) QBER distri-
bution (The FWHM of the QBER is ∼0.6%)
7.5. First ﬁeld trials in the Siemens network
The results in the laboratory environment were very promising. The ﬁrst measurements outside
the laboratory were carried out at an oﬃce in Erdberg (ERD). From there, two ﬁbre loops routed
via two other Siemens-locations Siemensstrasse (SIE) and Gudrunstrasse (GUD) were accessible
(see ﬁgure 8.3 for the geographical layout of the locations and ﬁbres).
 ERD-GUD-ERD: 5dB, 12km
 ERD-SIE-ERD: 8dB, 32km
Figure 7.6 shows the results (key rate and QBER) obtained over 24 hours. Note that only
SourceStab and PolCtrl were available during the trial.
During the measurements, we noticed several other important inﬂuences:
 The complete QKD system (Alice, Bob, detectors, monitoring computer and database
server) produces a lot of heat that leads to room temperatures up to 35◦C when no air
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Figure 7.6.: Results of a 24h trial with the deployed ERD-GUD-ERD ﬁbre. See ﬁgure 8.3 for an geo-
graphical outline of the ﬁbre. The FWHM of the QBER distribution is 1.2%
conditioning is available. At some temperature (∼30◦C) the detectors will automatically
shutdown.
 Opening the window helps to lower the temperature. However, every temperature change
immediately aﬀects the runtime of the electronic pulses in Alice and Bob leading to lower
coincidence rate due to the mismatch of the detector gates in respect of the arrival of the
single photons. Every reduction of the coincidence rate also increase the QBER because
of the lower ratio between coincidences and dark counts and hence strongly reduces the
key rate. We therefore needed a reliable module for periodic detector synchronisation
(FindDelay, see section 6.4.1).
 Before the measurement, the state had to be aligned manually. Since it was our goal
to achieve a complete hands-oﬀ operation of the QKD system, we had to conceive the
automatic state alignment module (StateAlign, see section 6.2).
 From the rather large temporal ﬂuctuations of the QBER, one can conclude that the po-
larisation stabilisation module (PolCtrl) was not able to compensate every drift in the
complete QKD system (see 6.2.5). With the automatic state (re-) alignment, we are con-
ﬁdent to keep the environmental ﬂuctuation of the QBER lower than 1%.
For the long link (ERD-SIE-ERD), the chromatic dispersion (∼20ps/km/nm) becomes dominant.
The broadening of the time distribution of the photons (bandwidth ∼3nm) to Δt ≈ 2ns leads
to further losses because of the rather small gate width of the detectors (∼1.5 ns). For a short
test (30min) we could obtain a key rate of about 450 bps with a QBER of about 7.5%.
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Network in Vienna
The previous chapters described the details of our QKD system based on entangled photons. As
every other QKD system, it has two major drawbacks:
 A QKD system provides only a point-to-point link
 A QKD link is intrinsically limited in distance
Both disadvantages make it diﬃcult to straightforwardly build a practical quantum cryptography
network. The goal of the European FP6-project SECOQC (secure communication based on
quantum cryptography) [2] was to build such a network structure. The ﬁrst prototype has been
demonstrated in October 2008 in the ﬁbre network of Siemens Vienna, a typical Metropolitan
Area Network (MAN). The prototype includes 8 diﬀerent QKD links - among of them our system
based on entanglement.
This chapter will give an overview of the architecture of the quantum network in Vienna, the
integration of our QKD system to the network and the results we have obtained during the test
phase in October 2008.
8.1. Architecture of the SECOQC network
A prototype of a simple network structure based on optical switching has been presented 2003
[40] in Boston, USA. This structure allowed to distribute keys between many clients but not
to exceed the distance limitation. A quantum repeater network [41] is a possibility to overcome
the distance limitation but not yet technological feasible. Other QKD networks based on the
same approach as the network in Vienna also have been demonstrated in China [42] and south
Durban, South Africa [43] on a much smaller scale.
The SECOQC approach is based on trusted nodes and provides the infrastructure for a key
distribution network (”network of secrets”) and encryption of user-data. The architecture of the
SECOQC quantum network is structured in three layers [44]:
QKD links: Several point-to-point QKD links build the so-called Quantum Back Bone (QBB)
network. The links can form any topology like a star, ring, chain or meshed structure as shown
in ﬁgure 8.1. Each QKD device is located in a QBB node that is considered to be trusted, i.e.
to be placed at a secure site. The node is the central element in the network architecture. The
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QBB Link
QBB NodeQAN Node
Point-to-Point
Quantum Key 
Distribution
Many-to-many 
Key distribution 
Application
(Data encryption )
Figure 8.1.: The three-layer architecture of the SECOQC network.
QKD links establish secure keys on a point-to-point basis and pass them to the nodes where
the keys are stored. A single-ended node is usually referred to as a Quantum Access Network
(QAN) node.
Many-to-many Key Distribution: The main feature of the SECOQC network is the possibility
to distribute the keys to non-adjacent nodes in a hop-by-hop scheme. The ﬂexibility of a meshed
QBB network allows several other beneﬁts like alternative routes to increase the reliability of the
network and parallel operation to increase the overall key rate. All the features of the SECOQC
network in Vienna have been demonstrated during the conference and will be discussed later in
details.
Key Usage (Data Encryption): The distributed keys between two nodes (adjacent or not) can be
used to encrypt data. For this purpose each node provides interfaces (AES or OTP) to encrypt
and transmit data between to clients that are connected to the nodes.
8.2. Outline of the Vienna Network
The prototype network [3] consists of 6 nodes and 8 QKD links (ﬁgure 8.2 and 8.3). The 6
nodes are located at Siemens oﬃces: SIE (Siemensstraße), ERD (Erdbergerla¨nde), GUD (Gu-
drunstraße), BREIT (Breitenfurterstraße), STP (St. Po¨lten), FORUM (Siemens Forum). The
four nodes SIE, ERD, GUD and BREIT are so-called QBB (Quantum Back Bone) nodes while
STP and FORUM are QAN (Quantum Access Network) nodes. Each node is connected by two
standard ﬁbres that are laid out in the underground of Vienna and provided by Siemens Aus-
tria. One ﬁbre acts as the quantum channel, the other one as the classical channel. Each node
provides an interface for the QKD links to access the classical channel.
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Figure 8.2.: Outline of the SECOQC quantum cryptography network in Vienna. The eight QKD links
(table 8.1) come from ﬁve diﬀerent SECOQC-partners (Universities and companies). Each
pair is connected with a standard telecom-ﬁber for the quantum channel (solid lines). An-
other ﬁbre (dashed) connects the nodes to supply the classical channel.
Link Distance Supplier Technology
SIE-ERD 16km University of Vienna Entangled Photons
ERD-GUD 6km Institut d’Optique Paris Continuous variables
SIE-BREIT 32km Toshiba One way weak pulse system
SIE-GUD 22km idQuantique Autocompensating plug&play
ERD-FORUM 80m LMU Munich Weak pulse free space
BREIT-GUD 19km idQuantique Autocompensating plug&play
BREIT-ERD 25km idQuantique Autocompensating plug&play
BREIT-STP 85km University of Geneva Coherent one way
Table 8.1.: QKD links for the SECOQC network in Vienna. Details on the other system can be found
on the SECOQC website [2]
8.2.1. Demonstration of the quantum network
During summer 2008, a test network has been build up in a laboratory at ARC (Austrian
Research Centers). During this time, all QKD systems were integrated to the network nodes.
Section 8.3 will describe how this is done for our entanglement based system. After testing the
infrastructure, the whole network has been deployed to the Siemens locations in September. This
section gives a short overview of the network’s features that have been demonstrated during the
SECOQC conference (8th - 10th October 2008).
Many-to-Many Key Distribution: For example, a client at the Siemens Forum wants to send
some important data to the Siemens headquarter in Siemensstrasse (SIE). For this purpose, both
nodes (SIE and FORUM) need the same key. The SECOQC network provides the infrastructure
to distribute keys in a many-to-many basis. This is done in a hop-by-hop scheme (ﬁg. 8.4). In
the same manner, the chain can be extended in an information theoretical way. Note that the
complete chain is only secure if and only if all intermediate nodes are secure.
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Figure 8.3.: Map of the node-locations and ﬁbres for the SECOQC network in Vienna. The Siemens
Forum (FORUM) is close to location ERD (100m). The thicker line corresponds to our
QKD link between SIE and ERD. It crosses the river Danube and partially runs parallel to
the highway with the highest traﬃc in Austria. Satellite images taken from Google Earth.
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SIE
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Node 4 Free Space
FORUM
Node 6
K46K34
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K46K34
Figure 8.4.: Scheme for the hop-by-hop distribution of keys. Two QKD links provide the point-to-point
keys (K34 and K46). The node in the middle (ERD) encrypts the ﬁrst key (K46) using
one-time-pad (OTP) and K34 and sends it to node 3 (SIE). The latter decrypts the payload
using K34 and obtains K46. Now, the nodes at SIE and FORUM share the same key (K46)
which can be used to encrypt the data from the clients.
Alternative routing: An attack on one of the QKD links will force it to reduce the key rate
or even stop the key generation. Say the key store between two nodes (adjacent or not) is
exhausted. The meshed structure of the quantum network in Vienna allows to distributed keys
even in this case - over an alternative route. Exactly this scenario was demonstrated during
the SECOQC conference. We simulated an attack on our QKD link using a heavily attenuated
laser at 1550nm1 that is coupled to the quantum channel with a ﬁbre beam splitter. The OTP-
encrypted telephone call from FORUM to SIE (via ERD) was continued until the key storage
of the SIE-ERD link has been exhausted. Subsequently, the key has been distributed on the
alternative route FORUM-ERD-BREIT-SIE.
BREIT
Node 2
GUD
Node 5
SIE
Node 3
ERD
Node 4
To
sh
ib
a
C
V
idQ-3
Entangled Free Space
FORUM
Node 6
Eve
idQ
-1 idQ-2
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Figure 8.5.: (color) The direct path from FORUM to SIE becomes insecure due to an attack on the
entangled QKD system. The meshed structure of the network allows to choose a diﬀerent
path, i.e. the key will be distributed via node BREIT.
1Clearly, this is probably the worst attack since no real information was extracted. However, the idea was to
simulate a classical ampliﬁer that introduces some noise in the quantum channel.
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8.3. Integration of the entangled QKD system to the network
The laboratory prototype of our QKD system was not directly compatible to the SECOQC ar-
chitecture. To integrate the system into the SECOQC network, we had to make several changes.
For example, the QKD stack was running on a single computer. This is practicable but how-
ever unacceptable for the SECOQC demonstration, furthermore it is insecure to send the raw
measurement results over the network. Due to the low performance of the CPU (PPC405 at
300Mhz) on the Xilinx boards it is not possible to run the QKD post processing stack directly
on Alice and Bob [37]. We therefore decided to put the QKD stack on a virtual machine on the
node computers. The management module which coordinates the complete QKD system also
runs on the node computer. A standardised interface called QBB Link Interface [2] is used to
build up the connection to the actual node module mode which contains the key store.
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Figure 8.6.: Overview of the QKD system as it was integrated into the SECOQC network. Manage-
ment module and the QKD protocol stack are placed in the node modules. The nodes are
connected using SFP (small form-factor pluggable) modules including a WDM (wavelength
division multiplexer) for bidirectional classical communication.
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8.3.1. Q3P Tunneling
Apart from the communication over the quantum channel, the complete QKD system requires
a lot of classical communication (see ﬁgure 8.7): the classical parts of the BB84 protocol, the
stabilisation and automation modules (chapter 6) and the monitoring software (appendix A).
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Figure 8.7.: Overview of the communication scheme for the complete QKD system showing IP addresses
and UDP ports. Note that the QKD Monitoring software (see sec. A.1) is placed at Alice’s
location (SIE) during the SECOQC demonstration
.
In the SECOQC architecture, a proprietary protocol called Q3P [45] (quantum point-to-point
protocol) is used for the classical communication between the two devices forming the QKD
link. Q3P provides plain, authenticated or encrypted communication on a point-to-point basis.
A direct connection between the QKD devices (e.g. from PolBob to PolAlice via TCP or UDP)
is not available. Every communication between the locations has to be carried out trough the
Q3P instance. To solve this problem, every classical communication in our system is tunnelled
trough the Q3P channel via the management module that forwards the message to the receiver
(see ﬁg. 8.8).
PolAlice Alice
Management 
Module
Classical Channel
Q3PQ3P Instance
Node SIE
19" box Alice
UDP/IP
PolBob Bob
Management 
Module
Q3P Instance
Node ERD
19" box Alice
UDP/IP
Figure 8.8.: (color) Scheme of the Q3P tunnelling for the classical communication between Alice and
Bob. In the example above, Bob sends his count rates to PolAlice (used for SourceStab).
The MM on Bob’s side receives the message and forwards it to the MM on Alice’s side.
71
8. The SECOQC Quantum Cryptography Network in Vienna
8.3.2. Final Node Setup
Figure 8.9 shows the two racks containing the nodes SIE and ERD. Our Alice is placed in SIE
and Bob in ERD. Each QKD device is connected to the internal interface of the node using
an Ethernet switch. Another switch with single mode ﬁbre SFP modules is used to connect the
external node interfaces. This also provides the classical channel for the QKD devices. The racks
were placed in ordinary oﬃces without air-conditioning.
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Figure 8.9.: (a) schematic outline of the node in Siemensstrasse (SIE). The QKD devices are connected
to the internal node interface. The nodes themselves and the clients are connected to the
external (public) interface.
(b) photo of the actual node in SIE. All components (QKD devices, switches, node module)
are in installed in a 19-inch rack. The voice-over-IP telephone is used to make OTP encrypted
calls to any other node.
(c) node at ERD containing Bob. Only the four id200 detectors are placed outside the rack
(because of a missing platform for the 19-inch rack in ERD).
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8.4. Results during the two-week SECOQC demonstration
This section presents the major results we obtained during the two week demonstration in
the SECOQC network from Oct. 8th (ﬁrst day of the conference) until Oct. 22nd. It must be
stressed that all results presented here were obtained without any manual intervention to the
QKD system.
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Figure 8.10.: Final secure key rate and QBER during the two-week demonstration of the SECOQC
network.
Figure 8.10 shows key rate and QBER during the two-weeks demonstration. One can identify
three major facts that will be discussed in detail within this section
 The QBER has been very stable between 3.0% and 4.5% with an average value of 3.5%.
 The key rate shows a slight decrease from 2500 bps to 2000 bps. One can also see a
large ﬂuctuation in the key-rate. Both is caused by a problem with the long-term stability
(temperature dependency) of the id200 detectors (see sec. 8.4.1). The overall average lies
at about 2100 bps.
 There are several gaps, i.e. interruptions of the QKD process including three longer ones.
These are caused primarily by problems in the classical parts of the network (see sec. 8.4.2)
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Figure 8.11 shows the entanglement visibility (deﬁned as V = max−minmax+min where max is the maxi-
mal coincidence rate for orthogonal polariser settings and min the minimal coincidence rate for
parallel polariser settings) and temperature in the oﬃce where node ERD was located.
The average visibility is about 93%. A conﬁdence level of 99.9% to obtain a visibility higher than
90% is achieved. Very low values (<90%) are caused by strong mechanical changes of the ﬁbre
during work in the node-rooms. The temperature has been measured in the node room ERD
and is caused by the open window. This was the only way to keep the temperature in the room
low. The situation also applies for the other node room in SIE (Alice).
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Figure 8.11.: Visibility and temperature during the two weeks demonstration. One can see that the
system manages automatically to keep the entanglement stable on a high visibility despite
the high temperature ﬂuctuations in the oﬃce ERD where Bob was installed.
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Figure 8.12 show key rate and QBER during the ﬁrst 48 hours. One can see a periodic temporal
drift in the QBER. We expected this behaviour as a result of heavily temperature ﬂuctuations
in the room. As intended, the management module starts a re-alignment of the entangled state
when QBER rises above a threshold value (initial QBER + 1%).
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Figure 8.12.: Final key rate and QBER during the ﬁrst 48h of the demonstration.
Figure 8.13 shows the correlation between QBER drifts and temperature ﬂuctuations. The large
temperature ﬂuctuations in the node rooms cause a drift of the polarisation that cannot be
compensated by PolCtrl (see section 6.2.5). Strong temperature changes will immediately lead
to drifts in the QBER while a constant temperature (e.g. between hours 7 to 13 and 22 to 28)
also keeps the QBER stable.
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Figure 8.13.: (color) QBER and temperature measured inside the ERD node room during the ﬁrst 30h.
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Figure 8.14 compares the QBER distributions during the complete two week demonstration
(336h) and a typical 12h-run under laboratory conditions. The temperature-induced polarisa-
tion drifts lead to a slight asymmetry in the 336h-distribution towards higher QBER values.
Values above 5% are negligible (probability 0.1%). Note that the FWHM of the QBER distri-
bution is about 0.8% which is very close to the best-case value during tests under laboratory
conditions (0.6%). The value is signiﬁcantly better than the ﬁrst 24h measurements in the SEC-
OQC network (1.2%, see ﬁg. 7.6) because of the new stabilisation modules. Note also that the
QBER distribution in the real-world ﬁbre is the same for the ﬁrst two days and the complete
two weeks period. We therefore believe that a reliable entanglement distribution is possible for
even much longer periods than two weeks.
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Figure 8.14.: QBER distribution during the complete two-week demonstration (336h) and a typical 12h-
run under laboratory conditions.
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8.4.1. Long-term stability of the InGaAs detectors
During the two-week demonstration we noticed a strong ﬂuctuation of the coincidence rate
that is correlated to the temperature in the node room (see ﬁg. 8.15). One can see that the
coincidence rate decreases with low temperatures. We also noticed that the dark count rate
decreases proportional. Therefore, we assume that the reduced coincidence rate is caused by a
reduced single photon detection eﬃciency.
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Figure 8.15.: Correlation between the coincidence rate of the id200 detetors and room temperature where
the detectors are located (node ERD). The lower rates below the average line are due to
the state realignment which is triggered by the large ﬂuctuation of the temperature.
The dilemma is that the window in node room ERD could not be closed because no air condi-
tioning was available. The temperature would immediately rise to more then 30◦C which causes
the detectors to shutdown. On the other hand, the open window caused the large temperature
ﬂuctuation seen in ﬁgure 8.15. We have reported the problem to idQuantique where the problem
could be reproduced and is further investigated. Note that this problem should not occur in
an appropriate environment with air conditioning (a typical server room is kept to a constant
temperature of about 22◦C ± 1◦).
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8.4.2. System availability
In ﬁgure 8.10, one can see that there are several gaps in the key generation process. As long
as the key rate is higher than the consumption rate, the key store in the nodes can buﬀer an
interruption of the single QKD link. When the buﬀer is exhausted, an alternative route for key
distribution must be taken. For normal data encryption (e.g. video conference), we used AES
with a key exchange rate of 4 seconds and a key usage of about 1000 bps. On a two-week average,
our QKD link produced about 2100 secure bits per second (when the link is running). Hence, the
minimum availability should be 48% to guarantee a seamless key exchange without exhausting
the key storage.
Detector shutdown
7%
Network interruptions
19%
Active QKD
69%
State re-alignment
5%
Figure 8.16.: Pie chart showing the proportion of active QKD and interruptions during the two-week
SECOQC demonstration.
From ﬁg. 8.16 one can see that we achieved more than the minimum required availability (48%)
with an uptime of about 226 hours (67%), despite numerous interruptions:
 Most of the downtime (65 hours, 19%) has been caused by various problems in the classical
parts of the prototype-network. This is not surprising since the SECOQC architecture is
based on proprietary protocols like Q3P [45]. However, it is remarkable that the classical
parts of the network caused more down-time than the quantum optical part (65h vs. 17h
for state-alignments).
 We decided to shut down the detectors after we recognised a signiﬁcant decrease in the
count rate. Later, we found out that a restart does not help (see previous section) to
avoid the temperature dependency of the detection eﬃciency. A second shutdown has
been caused by an increase of the room temperature above 27◦C. Both shutdowns led to
a total interruption of 22.5 hours (7%).
 The large ﬂuctuation of the temperature causes a rather fast increase of the QBER2. On
average, the management module therefore had to initiate a re-alignment of the entangled
state every 2.5 hours. Every re-alignment takes about 5-10 minutes. In total, the state
re-alignments caused a total interruption of 16.6 hours (5%)
2Temperature ﬂuctuations in the node room where Bob is installed cause a polarisation drift in the BB84 module
that cannot be compensated by PolCtrl, see sec. 6.3.5.
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8.5. Use-case scenario: “Long Night of Science”
The so-called “Lange Nacht der Forschung” (long night of science) is a public exhibition that
took place on November 4th. Almost 400 research groups in several locations throughout Austria
presented their work.
We presented a complete quantum cryptography system that consists of our entanglement based
QKD system and two SECOQC nodes (SIE and ERD, see ﬁg. 8.17). A video conference between
two clients was encrypted using AES with a key-exchange interval of 10 seconds (key usage:
about 400 bps). The clients (two notebooks with webcams) were placed on diﬀerent tables and
each connected to a node. The ERD client displayed the video from a webcam on top of the SIE
client and vice-versa. Alice and Bob were connected by a 25km ﬁbre spool. The QKD Monitor
software (A.1) allowed the audience to watch inﬂuences on the quantum channel (e.g. shaking
the ﬁber).
Client SIE
Client ERDQKD Monitoring
Quantum 
Channel
(25km)
Classical
Channel
Node SIE Node ERD
Bob's 
Detectors
Alice Bob
Webcam
Webcam
Figure 8.17.: The complete quantum cryptography setup during the “Lange Nacht der Forschung”. The
nodes encrypt the bidirectional video-stream between the clients. Our QKD system pro-
vides the keys over a 25km ﬁbre.
The public interest was enormous. However, the scenario is interesting because of several other
reasons: We were able to deploy a complete quantum cryptography system within several hours to
a location in Vienna. Transport from the Austrian Research Centers to the main building of the
University of Vienna took about 60 minutes. When Alice and Bob are not in the same building,
one has to consider at least another hour. To build up the 19”-racks, computers, nodes, QKD
devices and connect the various components, about 90 minutes are necessary. Our plug&play
QKD system just needs to be connected, starts completely automatically and produces the ﬁrst
keys 20 minutes later (∼1500 bps, 3.2% QBER). Note that only two detectors were used for the
public demonstration.
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Here, a summary of the achievements in this thesis is given, together with an outlook of further
experiments and improvements.
 Fully automated long-term operation of the whole QKD system which is compatible with
standard 19-inch racks
 Stable hands-oﬀ entanglement distribution in an inner-city laid-out ﬁbre even in worst-case
conditions with high temperature ﬂuctuations.
 Average visibility of 93% during the two-weeks network demonstration. With a conﬁdence
level of 99.9% to have a visibility higher than 90%.
 Reliable key distribution: more than 2kbit/s and 3.5% QBER during the two-week demon-
stration. The QBER ﬂuctuation (FWHM) was about 0.8%, compared to 0.6% in a labo-
ratory environment.
 The uptime of the QKD link has been about 67% during the demonstration. We expect to
achieve system availability of 97% in a standard server-room environment.
 Simple deployment of a complete quantum cryptography system when the QKD system is
combined with the SECOQC infrastructure.
As mentioned in the introduction, every QKD system participating in the SECOQC network
had to fulﬁl several criteria regarding key rate, stability and hands-oﬀ operation. What makes
our system diﬀerent from the others is that is based on entanglement. Entanglement is a re-
source also for other quantum information techniques like quantum teleportion, quantum dense
coding and quantum computing. Entanglement also plays an important role for QKD issues like
device-independent security schemes [46]. We therefore believe that the maturity of entangle-
ment distribution and QKD achieved within this thesis is an important step not just for practical
quantum cryptography but also for other quantum information schemes.
Still, there are some possible improvements of the current QKD system and open security issues
that are shortly summarised in this chapter.
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9.1. Towards a continuous operation of the quantum cryptography
system
If we assume that the problems in the classical part of the network can be solved and the
nodes are placed in an environment with a stable temperature (e.g. a typical server room), the
dominating reasons for an interruption of the QKD can be eliminated.
We are very conﬁdent that a stable long-term operation of the complete entanglement-based
quantum cryptography system (QKD system + two node modules) is possible. From ﬁg. 8.14
one can see that the QBER distribution is almost the same for 12 hours and 2 weeks. This
suggests that a stable entanglement distribution should be possible for longer periods as well.
When Alice and Bob are placed in a temperature stable environment, the average re-alignment
period should be increased from 2.5 hours to at least 5 hours. Hence, a hands-oﬀ and stable key
generation with an average uptime of about 97% is achievable without any further changes to
the QKD system.
9.2. Stabilised BB84 module
At the moment, Bob’s BB84 module consists of standard ﬁbre components (BS, PBS) that are
connected by FC/PC plugs and connection ﬁbres with a length of one metre. Hence, the complete
BB84 module becomes very prone to polarisation drifts caused by temperature ﬂuctuations.
As pointed out earlier (sec. 6.3.5), this has indeed been a large problem during the network
demonstration because of the lack of any air conditioning in the node rooms.
We expect a signiﬁcant improvement of the polarisation stability with a new, spliced BB84
module with shorter ﬁbre connections that is furthermore mounted on a temperature stabilised
(e.g.using peltier elements) plate .
A diﬀerent stabilisation approach - based solely on the QBER - is presented in the next section.
This approach should be able to compensate every polarisation drift, independent of its origin
without disrupting the QKD operation.
9.3. QBER based state stabilisation
The current approach of polarisation stabilisation (PolCtrl, see sec. 6.3) relies on strong reference
pulses with a ﬁxed polarisation that are sent from PolAlice and analysed by PolBob. PolCtrl can
only compensate drifts in the quantum channel but not in other parts of the system (mainly the
ﬁbre-based BB84 module in Bob). Our experiences during the two-week SECOQC trial showed
that the latter is dominating. The laid-out ﬁbre itself is rather stable1.
1See for example [7] where several polarisation measurements of the ﬁbre links are shown
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A diﬀerent approach is to use the QBER itself to stabilise the entangled state. In principle, one
could use the same approach that SourceStab (sec. 6.1) uses. Two polarisation controllers, one
in each basis could be driven consecutively by the hill-climber algorithm to minimise the QBER.
The results from the automatic state alignment procedure (sec. 6.2) show that this approach
works well and compensates even polarisation drifts that are not compensated by the current
PolCtrl. In the current scheme of our system, it is no problem to send the QBER to PolBob.
This would not even require an additional Q3P-tunnel.
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Figure 9.1.: Alternative schemes for a QBER based polarisation control.
(a) in variant 1 a polarisation controller is placed in every arm of the BB84 module
to stabilise each measurement basis separately. This approach allows to compensate
every drift, even if it occurs in the BB84 module itself.
(b) in variant 2 a temperature stabilised BB84 module is assumed reducing polar-
isation drifts in the BB84 module. Remaining unavoidable drifts in the quantum
channel can be compensated using a single polarisation controller. The second con-
troller is used only for the initial alignment at the system start-up. The advantage
of the second variant is that less DAC-channels (degrees of freedom) have to be
controlled by PolBob during the control cycle.
The QBER based stabilisation has the further advantage that no auxiliary optics (reference-
diodes, ﬁbre-switches and polarimeter) are necessary as shown in ﬁg. 9.1. Additionally, the QKD
does not need to be interrupted. As in the case of SourceStab, this approach can run parallel to
the QKD operation.
Because of the high statistical ﬂuctuation (FWHM is about 0.6%, see ﬁgure 8.14), one would
need a long averaging time to obtain a reliable QBER value. Since typical ﬂuctuations in the
laid-out ﬁbre are in the range of 2-3 hours, this should not be a problem. We also assume that a
temperature stabilised environment for Alice and Bob should reduce the ﬂuctuation in the BB84
module to about 5-6 hours.
The only disadvantage of this scheme is that it is rather slow and cannot directly compensate
short term ﬂuctuations like mechanical movement of the ﬁbre. However, our management module
has the ability to detect a short-term increase of the QBER and start a re-alignment immediately.
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9.4. Side-channel Attacks
Beside theoretical attacks on the BB84 protocols, a completely diﬀerent class of (technologically
feasible) attacks, the so-called side channel attacks exist. Eve tries to take advantage of any
information leakage or even tries to actively attack the system exploiting imperfect implemen-
tations.
Here, an overview of some side-channel attacks that apply to our QKD system is given. Note
that each attack only allows to make some statistical assumptions on the raw key and does not
give full knowledge of the complete (raw) key.
9.4.1. Detector eﬃciency mismatch
An obvious weak point is caused by diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of single photon detectors. This
leads to a slightly biased count rate, i.e. more ones than zeros in the raw key. This also applies
to our QKD system. The diﬀerence in the count rate for the four detectors on Alice’s side is
about 10%. On Bob’s side, the detection eﬃciency of the InGaAs detectors can be matched by
manually changing the bias voltage. Another possibility is to discard a fraction of the counts from
detectors with higher eﬃciency to obtain a equal count rate. Alternatively, a stronger privacy
ampliﬁcation with an estimated information leakage can be used.
9.4.2. Response time mismatch
A diﬀerent type of side-channel attack makes use of diﬀerences in the response times of the
detectors[47]. In our case, the four detector modules on Alice’s side are susceptible to this
problem and introduce a detector dependent delay between the synch-pulse (1610nm) and the
single photon (1550nm). Eve could obtain some knowledge by measuring the time between the
photon and the trigger pulse (ﬁg. 9.2). The typical diﬀerence of the central position if the time-
distributions lies around some hundreds picoseconds and hence is resolvable2.
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Figure 9.2.: Eve could measure the time between the sync-pulse and the single photon using a time-
tagging unit (TTU) to gain knowledge of Alice’s measurement result. Without compensation,
the time between trigger and photon depends on the diﬀerent response times of the detectors
(e.g. tV for the vertical detector and tH for the horizontal detector).
2Bob’s time-tagging-unit has a resolution of 82ps. However, we also have to assume that Eve has better equipment
as it is available now
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The individual delay lines on Alice’s FPGA board can be used to compensate the diﬀerent
response time of the detectors. This needs to be done manually in the laboratory before the
system is deployed. We assume that temperature ﬂuctuations cause the same change in the
detector response for every detector. However, this still needs to veriﬁed experimentally. If this
assumption turns out to be wrong, a similar re-synchronisation module as we have it on Bob’s
side (FindDelay, see sec. 6.4.1) is necessary.
To verify the correct response-time compensation, we can use Bob’s time-tagging unit3. When
Alice triggers only one detector4, Bob can measure the time-distribution of the detection event
in respect to the trigger. This can be done for every Si-APD detector. Diﬀerences in the time
distribution indicate a diﬀerence in the detector response time. The measurement should be
carried out with and without the individual delay lines to measure the original time-distribution
and to see if the compensation works correctly. Note that the time distribution must be measured
always with the same detector on Bob’s side.
9.4.3. Time-shift attack
A similar approach [48] makes use of imperfect synchronisation between the photon and the
detector gates. This attack applies to all QKD schemes with gated detectors. Thus also to our
system. Eve actively changes the delay between the trigger and the single photons. From ﬁg.
9.3, one can see that such a change (e.g. position A or B) causes a diﬀerence in the coincidence
rate and hence an eﬃciency mismatch (9.4.1).
Coincidence rate
DelayBA 0
Coincidence rate
DelayBA 0
(a) (b)
Figure 9.3.: Principal scheme of the time-shift attack.
(a) The green and orange lines show the time-distribution of two detectors in one basis when
Eve delays the photon in respect to the detector gate or vice versa.
(b) The time-shift attack is not possible when the time-distribution of both detectors have
the same centre position in respect to the trigger pulse.
When Eve chooses a ﬁxed delay (e.g. position A), she might get caught because Alice and Bob
could notice the diﬀerent coincidence rates. In our case, the management module monitors the
coincidence rates. When Eve frequently switches between delay A and B, the overall coincidence
rate will be the same for both detectors.
3that is usually used to set the auxiliary coincidence window, see section 6.4.2
4Alice is able to individually enable the detector inputs using the QSH interface.
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Note that diﬀerences in the gate width are not a problem considering a time-shift attack. From
ﬁg. 9.4, one can see that Eve cannot ﬁnd two delays A, B with diﬀerent detection eﬃciency
when the detectors are properly synchronised. Only an overall increase of the count rate of one
detector occurs which can be recognised easily).
Coincidence rate
Delay
A B0
Figure 9.4.: A time-shift attack is not possible when the detectors are synchronised properly even when
the gate width is diﬀerent.
From ﬁg. 6.14, one can see that our detectors in principle have a diﬀerent internal delay of
approx. 500ps (time between incoming trigger-pulse and the actual detection gate). We can
use the individual delay (on Bob) to compensate this diﬀerence. We believe, that the already
incorporated delay-adjustment module (FindDelay, see section 6.4.1) is able to compensate the
timing mismatch with the required precision (the maximum timing mismatch must not be higher
than the timing jitter). Of course, this needs to be veriﬁed experimentally, by testing the side-
channel attack on our system.
9.4.4. Implementation of the time-shift attack
A time-shift attack has already been implemented on the commercial idQuantique ID500 QKD
system [48]. In our system, the sync/trigger pulses and the single photons are transmited over
the quantum channel. Hence, Eve can implement the time-shift attack by delaying the photon
in respect to the trigger pulse.
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Figure 9.5.: Implementation of a time-shift attack on our QKD system
As mentioned above, we believe, that the precise detector-photon synchronisation protects us
from the time-shift attack. We can test this assumption by implementing the attack. Simpler as
the implementation in ﬁg. 9.5 is to use the internal delay in the idQuantique id200 detectors.
When the delays of all detectors are changed equally, all detector gates are delayed in respect to
the trigger pulse. However, such a measurement is not possible at the moment: the management
module periodically starts a re-synchronisation and compensates the introduced delay.
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9.4.5. Detector saturation loophole
A diﬀerent approach for a side-channel attack is presented in [49]. There, an error in the circuit
of Perkin Elmer Si-APD modules is exploited. A strong light pulse can bring the detector from
Geiger mode (which is used to detect single photons) to linear mode (used to detect strong,
classical light pulses). By sending such a (non-polarised) pulse, Eve could bring all four detectors
in the BB84 module into linear mode. Another pulse with a certain polarisation and a certain
power can activate only the detector corresponding to the polarisation of the pulse, i.e. the
H-detector will click with certainty if Eve sends a horizontal pulse. This would allow Eve to
signiﬁcantly improve the intercept-resend attack.
This attack has some signiﬁcance for our system since we use the same type of detector on Alice
side. However, Eve has no access to the ﬁbre that connects the source and Alice’s BB84 module
because the entanglement source and Alice are in the same place.
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9.5. Detectors
Telecom-wavelength (1550nm) single photon detectors are a major issue for every quantum
communication system. As pointed out in section 7.3, for longer distances towards and beyond
100km, the dark count rate becomes a dominant factor and hence determines the reach of a QKD
system. Another important factor is the hold-oﬀ time which is necessary to prevent so-called
afterpulsing detection events. Such an event is caused by a loosely trapped charge carrier that
causes an avalanche at the next gate pulse. The only way to prevent an afterpulsing event is to
wait for a certain time. In our case, this hold-oﬀ time is set to 10μs for every id200 detector.
Recently, Toshiba presented a very innovative InGaAs detector concept[50] to detect and quench
the avalanche much faster than previous quenching circuits. This signiﬁcantly reduces the after
pulsing probability and hence allows faster gating frequencies in the GHz region. Using these
detectors, a QKD system with GHz clocking has been presented with a secure key rate of 2.9kbps
at 100km [51].
A diﬀerent approach is pursued by upconversion detectors. Upconversion is the inverse eﬀect
of downconversion. The qubit-photon is combined with a strong laser pulse to be converted
to shorter wavelengths that can be detected by Si-APDs with high eﬃciency. In [52], such
upconversion detectors were integrated into a QKD system. The detectors had an quantum
eﬃciency of 2.1% a dark count rate of 2.8kHz and a low timing jitter (∼60ps).
Another interesting technologie is the superconducting photon detector (SSPD). In a supercon-
ducting nanowire, the energy of a single photon is enough to heat the wire leading to normal
conductivity. The diﬀerence in the current ﬂow can be measured. Using such detectors and
an attenuated laser clocked with 10 GHz, a QKD system over 200km [53] has been presented.
The huge disadvantage of the SSPD is the required cryogenic equipment. However, with such
detectors we believe that our system can easily reach 100km.
Detector Max. Clock Max.
count rate
Quantum
eﬃciency
Dark
counts
Timing
jitter
id200 4MHz 100kHz 10% 5·10−5/gate <600ps
Toshiba self-
diﬀerencing
1.25GHz 100MHz 11% 2·10−6/gate 55ps
Upconversion Free running 15MHz 2% 2800 Hz 66ps
SSPD Free running 1GHz 2% 10Hz 60ps
Table 9.1.: Comparison of available telecom wavelength single-photon detectors. Note that dark count
rate for the InGaAs detectors are referred to maximum clock rate. Data taken from [54, 50,
53, 52] and our results with the id200 detectors (see sec. 7.2.1)
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During the development of the modules explained in chapter 6 it was absolutely essential to
have a real time monitoring solution. Since each module inﬂuence several parameters of the
QKD system, we needed a comprehensive real-time view on the relevant data: QBER, secure
key rate, count rates, status information etc. Furthermore, we needed an eﬃcient method to
store the large amounts of data obtained during the long-term measurements combined with
comprehensive methods for post-measurement analysis.
At the beginning of 2008, for each device, a separate LabView program was running on a separate
computer. Each of them displayed the recent value on a small graph and wrote the value to simple
log ﬁles. This approach was already very impractical in a laboratory environment, but completely
impossible to use when the system is integrated in the SECOQC network where Alice and Bob
will be in diﬀerent locations in Vienna!
In this thesis, a diﬀerent approach is presented. A completely new solution for monitoring and
logging has been developed using components (Java, MySQL) that are a widespread standard
for professional software development. The solution consists of three components that will be
described in details in this chapter:
 The QKD Monitor software displays the values of the last minutes and last hours for each
component (Alice, Bob, PolAlice, PolBob and QKD) in real-time.
 The QKD Control Client allows to change several of parameters on Alice and Bob like
delays in real-time.
 The QKD Database is a MySQL database that holds every single value received by the
QKD Monitor.
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A.1. QKD Monitor
The QKD Monitor software (ﬁg. A.1) receives, displays and logs data (measurement results and
status messages) from all components used in the QKD system in real-time:
 From Alice: QBER, secure key rate, secure key size, sifted key size, number of wrong bits,
number of disclosed bits during error correction, count rate of all four Si-detectors
 From Bob: coincidence rates of all four InGaAs-detectors
 From PolAlice: Coordinates of all six piezo channels, temperature of the crystal controller
 From PolBob: stokes parameters for the H and P reference pulse, distance to the target
state before the PolCtrl cycle, distance after the PolCtrl cycle
QKD-DB
(MySQL)
Alice Bob PolAlice PolBob
Packet-Decoder
Counts Counts Piezo Stokes
GUI
Real-Time View
Averaged View
File
Logging
ASCII-File
QKD
Socket
Error
Handling
E-Mail
Notification
Socket Socket Socket Socket
Debug Console
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(JAVA)
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Status
Socket
Web 
Interface
Web-Access
Figure A.1.: Basic scheme for the QKD Monitor software written in Java. Every component of the
QKD system sends the data to the software where the packets are decoded. All values
are displayed and logged to the QKD Database (optionally also to an ASCII ﬁle). One can
choose between a real-time view of the latest values (∼15min) or a view with average values
(several hours). Status messages from PolAlice and PolBob can be displayed on a ”debug
console”. An internal interfaces allows to send error messages (e.g. detector failures) and
periodic summaries via e-mail. Another interface allows to access the status of the QKD
system over the internet via a (password secured) website.
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Figure A.2.: Screenshot of the QKD Monitor showing data during the SECOQC conference. One can
switch between the components (QKD, Alice, Bob, PolAlice, PolBob) using the tabs on the
top. The data of the last 15 minutes or the last 2 hours is displayed in the main graph. The
status line on the bottom gives some information on the duration and the database session.
Together with a remote-access software (e.g. TeamViewer [55]), we are able to view the status
of the QKD system from anywhere via the internet. This has been an important feature during
the SECOQC demonstration where Alice and Bob were located in diﬀerent locations in Vienna.
A.2. QKD Control Client
This client was conceived to control the QKD process and some parameters on Alice and Bob
during the laboratory tests. It has already been mentioned in section 6.4.1. The client allows to:
 Start and stop QKD
 Set the sifted key size
 Set the individual delay lines for Alice and Bob (see section 6.4.1)
 Set the auxiliary coincidence windows (see section 6.4.2) automatically or manually
Note that all of its functions have now been replaced by completely automated versions (Find-
Delay, FindWindow).
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A.3. QKD Database
Because of the large amount of diﬀerent type of data (count rates from Alice and Bob, status
information from PolAlice and PolBob and QKD data) we have set up a MySQL database to
manage the data. Databases are very commonly used for software development projects but
rather not widespread for logging scientiﬁc data. Compared to the standard way of logging mea-
surement results using text-based ﬁles, a database oﬀers tremendous advantages. A professional
planned database allows a structured storage of data, in our case measurement results. At the
moment, the QDK Database holds about 150 million entries. Note that those entries are not
single-photon measurements but mainly averaged (one second) values (count rates etc.). The
Structured Query Language (SQL) allows reading, writing or deleting data using a vast amount
of functions in a very convenient way. For a database containing scientiﬁc measurements, SQL
is especially advantageous for the post-measurement analysis of the data.
The QKD database consists of six tables:
Table Session
Contains basic information about a session which corresponds e.g. to a single
measurement or a long-term QKD test
Column Data type Comment
ID (PK) Integer Primary Key. Unique number that identiﬁes a ses-
sion with a numeric index. When starting a new
measurements (session), the ID is incremented.
Name Varchar A short name that describes the session
StartTime Datetime Date and time when the session was started
EndTime Datetime Date and time when the session was stopped
Comment Varchar Some comments on the measurement, e.g. details
on the environment
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Table QKD
Contains information on a block of secure key that leaves the QKD stack
Column Data type Comment
SessionID (FK) Integer Foreign Key to the session
Number (PK) Integer A index that is incremented for every new row. It is
set to one when a new session is started. SessionID
and Number uniquely identify a measurement value
InsertTime Datetime Date and time when the values was added to the
database
Block Int Block number
SysTime Int FPGA timestamp
QBER Float QBER in the block
Keysize Int Size of the secure key
SiftedKeysize Int Size of the sifted key
Keyrate Float Secure key rate of the block
DisclosedBits Int Number of disclosed bits during error correction
Table Alice
Contains information on the count rates of Alice’s detectors
Column Data type Comment
SessionID (FK) Integer Foreign Key to the session
Number (PK) Integer Numeric index indicating the row
InsertTime Datetime Date and time when the values was added to the
database
CountrateV Float Count rate of the vertical detector (one-second av-
erage)
CountrateH Float Count rate of the horizontal detector
CountrateP Float Count rate of the +45◦ detector
CountrateM Float Count rate of the -45◦ detector
Table Bob
Contains information on the coincidence rates of Bob’s detectors
Column Data type Comment
SessionID (FK) Integer Foreign Key to the session
Number (PK) Integer Numeric index indicating the row
InsertTime Datetime Date and time when the values was added to the
database
CountrateV Float Count rate of the vertical detector (one-second av-
erage)
CountrateH Float Count rate of the horizontal detector
CountrateP Float Count rate of the +45◦ detector
CountrateM Float Count rate of the -45◦ detector
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Table PolAlice
Contains status information of PolAlice (mainly SourceStab)
Column Data type Comment
SessionID (FK) Integer Foreign Key to the session
Number (PK) Integer Numeric index indicating the row
InsertTime Datetime Date and time when the values was added to the
database
MirrorX Integer Coordinate of the ﬁrst axis of the mirror-piezo
MirrorY Integer Coordinate of the second axis of the mirror-piezo
Coupler810X Integer Coordinate of the ﬁrst axis of the 810nm coupler-
piezo
Coupler810Y Integer Coordinate of the second axis of the 810nm coupler-
piezo
Coupler1550nmX Integer Coordinate of the ﬁrst axis of the 1550nm coupler-
piezo
Coupler1550nmY Integer Coordinate of the second axis of the 1550nm
coupler-piezo
Temp Float Temperature of the non-linear crystals that pro-
duces the entangled photons
94
A.3. QKD Database
Table PolBob
Contains status information of PolBob (mainly PolCtrl)
Column Data type Comment
SessionID (FK) Integer Foreign Key to the session
Number (PK) Integer Numeric index indicating the row
StokesParam HS 1 Float initial Stokes parameter S1 for the H-pulse
StokesParam HS 2 Float initial Stokes parameter S2 for the H-pulse
StokesParam HS 3 Float initial Stokes parameter S3 for the H-pulse
StokesParam PS 1 Float initial Stokes parameter S1 for the P-pulse
StokesParam PS 2 Float initial Stokes parameter S2 for the P-pulse
StokesParam PS 3 Float initial Stokes parameter S3 for the P-pulse
ADC H 1 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 1 (h-detector)
for the H-pulse
ADC H 2 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 2 (v-detector)
for the H-pulse
ADC H 3 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 3 (p-detector)
for the H-pulse
ADC H 4 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 4 (m-detector)
for the H-pulse
ADC H 5 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 5 (r-detector) for
the H-pulse
ADC H 6 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 6 (l-detector) for
the H-pulse
ADC P 1 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 1 (h-detector)
for the P-pulse
ADC P 2 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 2 (v-detector)
for the P-pulse
ADC P 3 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 3 (p-detector)
for the P-pulse
ADC P 4 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 4 (m-detector)
for the P-pulse
ADC P 5 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 5 (r-detector) for
the P-pulse
ADC P 6 Float ADC value of polarimeter channel 6 (l-detector) for
the P-pulse
Distance Begin Float Distance to the target state before the PolCtrl cycle
Distance End Float Distance to the target state after the PolCtrl cycle
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B. Classical Description of Polarisation
This chapter will give a short overview of the classical description of polarisation as it is used for
the polarisation stabilisation module (PolCtrl, see section 6.3). PolCtrl relies on strong reference
pulses that have a known polarisation when the pulses enter the quantum channel. PolBob uses
a polarimeter to measure the polarisation of the reference pulses after transmission. In contrast
to the single photons, the polarisation of a classical wave can be completely determined and is
usually described using the so-called Stokes parameters. To determine the polarisation, PolBob
measures the power of the horizontal (H), vertical (V), +45 ◦ (P), -45 ◦, right handed (R) and
left handed (L) components. This allows calculating the Stokes parameters:
S0 = PH + PV (B.1)
S1 = PH − PV (B.2)
S2 = PP − PM (B.3)
S3 = PR − PL (B.4)
The four Stokes parameters are combined to the Stokes vector:
−→
S =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
S0
S1
S2
S3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (B.5)
Usually, the Stokes vector is normalised using S0:
−→
S norm =
−→
S
S0
(B.6)
horizontal vertical +45◦ -45◦ right-handed left-handed
(H) (V) (P) (M) (R) (L)⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
1
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
−1
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
1
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
−0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
Table B.1.: Example for some Stokes vectors
The three components S1, S2 and S3 can be interpreted as coordinates that refer to a point on
a unit-sphere called the Poincare´ sphere (see for example ﬁgure 6.8).
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In our case PolBob measures the analogue voltages of the detector that are proportional to the
power. To obtain normalised Stokes parameters for the reference pulses as measured by PolBob,
we have to consider the minimum voltage (no light) and maximum voltage (incident light is
polarised identical as the polarisation that corresponds to the detector):
S1 =
VH − VH,min
VH,max − VH,min −
VV − VV,min
VV,max − VV,min (B.7)
Where Vx,min is the minimum, Vx,max the maximum and Vx the measured voltage, here in the
H/V basis.. The same is valid for S2 and S3 , in the P/M and R/L basis.
The degree of polarisation (DOP) is deﬁned as
DOP =
√
S21 + S
2
2 + S
2
3
S0
(B.8)
A fully polarised waves (e.g. from a laser) has a DOP of 1 while a completely depolarised wave
(e.g. classical thermal light) has a DOP of 0.
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E. Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit pra¨sentiert das erste vollautomatische, kompakte und zuverla¨ssige Quantenkryp-
tographie (Quantum Key Distribution - QKD) System auf Basis von verschra¨nkten Photonen.
Das System ist fu¨r die Integration in Standard 19-Zoll-Schra¨nke konzipiert und arbeitet mit einer
Wellenla¨nge von 1550nm fu¨r den optimalen Einsatz in Standard-Glasfasern. Mehrere neu ent-
wickelte Stabilisierungs- und Automatisierungsmodule (u.a. Stabilisierung der Verschra¨nkungs-
quelle, Stabilisierung der Polarisation in der Glasfaser und pra¨zise Detektor-Synchronisation)
sorgen fu¨r eine zuverla¨ssige Verteilung von verschra¨nkten Photonen.
Das QKD System wurde in das europa¨ische SECOQC (Development of a Global Network for
Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) Quantenkryptographie-Netzwerk in-
tegriert und im Oktober 2008 im Glasfaser-Netz von Siemens in Wien pra¨sentiert. Wa¨hrend der
zweiwo¨chigen Demonstration mit einer zwischen zwei Siemens-Standorten verlegten Glasfaser
(16km, 4dB) konnte eine durchschnittliche Verschra¨nkungs-Visibility von 93% erreicht werden.
U¨ber den gesamten Zeitraum hatten 99,9% aller Messwerte eine Visibility u¨ber 90%.
Die hohe Qualita¨t der Verschra¨nkung ermo¨glicht die Implementierung des BBM92 Quantum Key
Distribution Protokolls. Gemeinsam mit der SECOQC Infrastruktur ermo¨glicht dies die Inte-
gration eines praxistauglichen Quantenkryptographie-Systems. Wa¨hrend der zweiwo¨chigen Test-
phase konnte eine stabile Schlu¨sselerzeugungsrate von u¨ber 2000 bit/Sekunde mit einer QBER
(Quantum Bit Error Rate) von 3.5% erreicht werden ohne manuell in das System eingreifen zu
mu¨ssen. Im Labor konnte eine U¨bertragung bis zu 50km bei einer Schlu¨sselerzeugungsrate von
500 bit/Sekunde erzielt werden.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass es mo¨glich ist, verschra¨nkte Photonen in einem typischen inner-
sta¨dtischen Glasfasernetzwerk mit hoher Qualita¨t zuverla¨ssig zu verteilen und fu¨r die Quan-
tenkryptographie zu nutzen.
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